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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the Coast Guard Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security 
(PWCS) Outcome Measure. The first goal was to determine if the current measure 
accurately reflects Coast Guard mission effectiveness in achieving homeland security. 
The PWCS Outcome Measure provides information on risk reduction due to threat, 
vulnerability and consequence management by the Coast Guard with respect to 15 
maritime terrorism scenarios. While the current measure provides a good sense of Coast 
Guard effectiveness in reducing the risk of maritime terrorism, there are a number of 
areas for potential improvements. This finding led to the second goal of the research, 
which was to provide recommendations to more accurately assess Coast Guard homeland 
security mission effectiveness. As a formative evaluation of the PWCS Outcome 
Measure, the research provides insight into recommendations for improving this measure 
from several experts both inside and outside the Coast Guard. In addition, it outlines 
considerations to implement these recommendations.   
It is critical to optimize the application of limited resources to the issue of 
maritime terrorism, and this can only occur through accurate measurement of mission 
effectiveness in preventing terrorism. This study is applicable to the improved assessment 
of terrorism risk reduction efforts, especially in the maritime environment. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1. Background 
The Coast Guard has 11 mission programs that protect the “vital economic and 
security interests of the United States including the safety and security of the maritime 
public, our natural and economic resources, the global transportation system, and the 
integrity of our maritime borders.”1 Of these 11, five mission programs are directly 
related to homeland security: 
1. Drug Interdiction 
2. Migrant Interdiction 
3. Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security 
4. Other Law Enforcement 
5. Defense Readiness 
2. Condition 
Twelve measures are published in the latest Program Assessment on the Coast 
Guard Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (2006) mission-program area. Of these, 
one is an efficiency measure, seven are output measures, and four are outcome measures. 
The outcome measures are most indicative of effectiveness in achieving security in the 
maritime domain.  Three of the four outcome measures indicate estimated risk reduction 
due to Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence Management.  The outcome measure most 
indicative of the effectiveness in achieving maritime homeland security is the “Annual 
Percent Reduction in Terrorism-Related Maritime Risk.” This measure combines 
                                                 
1
 Thad W. Allen, Fiscal Year 2009 President’s Budget (statement to the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Sub-committee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast 
Guard, Washington, D.C., March 6, 2008) U.S. Coast Guard, 
http://www.uscg.mil/comdt/speeches/docs/CST_FY09_Budget_6_Mar_08.pdf (accessed March 6, 2008). 
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estimated risk reduction due to threat, vulnerability, and consequence management for 15 
different maritime attack scenarios into a proxy for Coast Guard outcome performance in 
achieving security in the maritime domain. The Program Assessment states, “In order to 
improve the validity and objectivity of the measure in the future, the Coast Guard intends 
to invite external experts to participate in the evaluation.”2 
3. Costs 
Using measures that do not accurately reflect mission effectiveness can give 
Coast Guard leaders and Congress a false sense of progress toward securing the 
homeland.  It also hampers efforts to optimize resource allocation.  Finally, it may lead to 
a focus on areas that do not need attention, misleading efforts to acquire improved 
technology, improve tactics, form stronger partnerships, and pursue better intelligence 
along with other activities in pursuit of improved operations.  Too much focus on areas 
that do not need attention will lead to resource misallocation, leading to the real cost: the 
danger that this resource misallocation could result in a successful terrorist attack in the 
U.S. maritime domain. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The Coast Guard publishes an annual Performance Summary, which reports 
effectiveness in each of the service’s 11 mission programs.  This research will examine 
the measures used to report on performance in the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal 
Security mission-program. 
1. Does the current measure accurately reflect Coast Guard mission 
effectiveness in achieving homeland security? 
2. If not, how can the Coast Guard construct a measure to accurately assess 
homeland security mission effectiveness? 
                                                 
2
 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Program Assessment on the Coast Guard Ports, Waterways 
and Coastal Security, Assessment Year 2006 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Management and Budget, 2006), 
White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003635.2006.html (accessed 
December 9, 2007).  
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C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
While an extremely large amount of research has been conducted in the field of 
risk assessment, a lesser amount of that research has focused on terrorism risk 
assessment.  There exists an even smaller body of work in the field of maritime terrorism 
risk assessment.  As a result, it is difficult for maritime agencies to rationally allocate 
resources in their quest to reduce maritime terrorism risk. While the incidence of 
maritime terrorism is significantly lower than land or air based terrorism, the principles 
underlying terrorism risk assessment in each environment are applicable to other 
environments.   
As previously mentioned, the Coast Guard publishes an annual Performance 
Summary which reports effectiveness in each of the service’s 11 mission programs.  This 
formative evaluation of the Coast Guard Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security 
Outcome Measure provides insight into recommendations for improving this measure 
from a number of experts both inside and outside the Coast Guard.  In addition, it will 
provide a plan to implement these recommendations.  It will be applicable to each of the 
three levels outlined above: maritime terrorism risk assessment, terrorism risk 
assessment, and risk assessment.  As a result, this research should be useful to those who 
wish to optimize resource allocation in their organization. It may also serve as a 
foundation for further studies in risk assessment, especially those in the area of maritime 
terrorism. 
This research will be of interest to those working in and around all of the nation’s 
361 seaports.  Since 95 percent of all commerce arrives in the United States through those 
ports, successful prevention of maritime terrorism affects every single person in this 
country.  It is critical to optimize the application of limited resources to the problem of 
maritime terrorism, and this can only occur through accurate measures of mission 
effectiveness in preventing terrorism. Homeland security practitioners and national 
leaders will find this study applicable to the improved assessment of terrorism risk 
reduction efforts, especially in the maritime environment. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Background 
The study of the measurement of Coast Guard mission effectiveness in achieving 
homeland security provides insight into the linkage between resource utilization and risk 
reduction so that the Coast Guard and other organizations can execute their missions 
while using taxpayer funding wisely by optimizing resource allocation.  While the study 
and implementation of measurement are both extremely important, these activities are not 
ends in themselves; they are merely means for an organization to ascertain whether it is 
making progress toward achieving its goals. This is the thesis put forth by William Casey 
in “Enterprise Excellence: Driving Strategic Results Instead of Metric Mania.”3 The 
article lays out a path between enterprise-wide goals and individual actions through 
informed decision making.  This requires the use of metrics to inform decision making, 
without allowing the collection and analysis of metrics to become the new goal of the 
organization. 
The goal of this research is to improve measurement of Coast Guard effectiveness 
in achieving homeland security.  This requires the ability to measure the current level of 
terrorism-related maritime risk and project the future level of risk given certain Coast 
Guard activities.  There are a number of sub-literatures that are germane to the 
assessment of terrorism risk and include literature on: 
1. Risk Assessment 
2. Risk Modeling 
3. Expert Judgment 
4. Event Trees 
                                                 
3
 William Casey et al., Enterprise Excellence: Driving Strategic Results Instead of Metric Mania 
(Lakewood, CO: Executive Leadership Group, 2006). 
 5
2. Risk Assessment   
Risk assessment is part of the larger risk management framework.  Conventional 
risk assessment defines risk as the probability of an undesired event multiplied by the 
cost of that event: R = P x C. Stephen Unwin and many other authors state that the 
probability of naturally occurring events such as earthquakes or hurricanes typically 
follows a Poisson distribution.4  Terrorism risk analysis defines risk as a function of three 
components: threat (probability that a specific target will be attacked in a specific way 
during a specified period), vulnerability (probability that damage occurs, given a threat), 
and consequences (the magnitude and type of damage resulting from a successful terrorist 
attack).5  Terrorism risk does not follow a Poisson distribution because terrorists adjust 
target selection based on the vulnerability of those targets (threat shifting)6 and terrorists 
use adaptive learning to modify future attacks in their quest for success.7  A number of 
authors have developed the threat shift model, of note is “Insurance, Self-Protection, and 
the Economics of Terrorism” by Darius Lakdawalla and George Zanjani.   
A key part of assessing terrorism risk is assessing the threat.  Gary Ackerman 
reviews various risk assessment methodologies, examines their failure to properly 
account for threat, and concludes that this failure leads to over/underestimation of risks, 
overlooking possible synergistic responses, and exclusion of the dynamic nature of 
terrorist threats.8   
                                                 
4
 Stephen D. Unwin, “Adaptability of Conventional Risk-Based Decision Methods to Homeland 
Defense,” (Los Alamos National Laboratory Risk Symposium, Santa Fe, NM, 2006), Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, http://risk.lanl.gov/site2k6/archives/pgm2006.html (accessed January 27, 2008). 
5
 Henry Willis et al., Estimating Terrorism Risk (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), xvi, 
RAND Corporation, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG388/ (accessed January 28, 2008). 
6
 Dino Falaschetti and Bryan Roberts, “Threat Shifting: A Key Issue in Terrorism Risk Analysis” 
(Presented at Los Alamos National Laboratory Risk Symposium, Santa Fe, NM, 2006) Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, http://risk.lanl.gov/site2k6/archives/pgm2006.html (accessed January 27, 2008). 
7
 Gordon Woo, Understanding Terrorism Risk (Newark, CA: Risk Management Solutions, 2002), 7, 
Risk Management Solutions, 
http://www.rms.com/Publications/UnderstandTerRisk_Woo_RiskReport04.pdf (accessed January 28, 
2008). 
8
 Gary Ackerman, “Chasing Shadows: Determining the Terrorist Threat,” (presented at Los Alamos 
National Laboratory Risk Symposium, Santa Fe, NM, 2007), Los Alamos National Laboratory, 
http://risk.lanl.gov/site2k7/RS2007Presentations.html (accessed January 2008). 
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A well-accepted method of risk assessment is probabilistic risk analysis.  
Numerous authors use this method to predict terrorism risk, including Greg Chavez et al. 
of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Office of Risk Analysis and Decision Support 
Systems, Carl Southwell of the USC Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of 
Terrorism Events, and Rajan Batta et al of the State University of New York at Buffalo.  
Willis and others have pointed out that a problem with using probabilistic risk analysis is 
the paucity of terrorism events compared to natural disasters.9  Improvements in 
probabilistic risk analysis in the assessment of terrorism risk will only be made when it is 
possible to more accurately quantify the dynamic nature of terrorist attacks, especially the 
effects of threat shifting. Just as the analysis of a moving weight on a beam is more 
difficult than the analysis of a dead weight on that same beam, analysis of an asymmetric 
terrorist attack is more difficult than analysis of symmetric warfare.  Research into the 
causative factors of threat shifting and their results will lead to more accurate 
probabilistic risk analysis of terrorism risk. 
3. Risk Modeling 
Since there is a shortage of data on which to base probabilistic risk analysis, 
researchers have sought alternative means to assess terrorism risk.  Among several 
authors, Seth Guikema offers game theory as a way to assess terrorism risk by modeling 
terrorist actions. Game theory models the interaction between terrorists (attackers) and 
defenders, is based on utility maximization, and allows development of a probabilistic 
statement of risk.10 Guikema points out three game theory assumptions: Instrumental 
Rationality, Consistently Aligned Beliefs, and Knowledge of the Rules. He shows that 
many decision makers do not exhibit Instrumental Rationality, terrorists and defenders do 
not hold Consistently Aligned Beliefs, and not all players know all possible actions 
(complete Knowledge of the Rules). While using game theory with the preceding 
                                                 
9
 Henry Willis et al., Terrorism Risk Modeling for Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-388-R TR-386-DHS, 2007), 6, RAND Corporation, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2007/RAND_TR386.sum.pdf, (accessed January 28, 2008). 
10
 Seth Guikema, “A Critical Assessment of Game Theory in Terrorist Risk Assessment” (Los Alamos 
National Laboratory Risk Symposium, Santa Fe, NM, 2006), Los Alamos National Laboratory, 
http://risk.lanl.gov/site2k6/archives/pgm2006.html (accessed January 2008). 
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assumptions does not perfectly model terrorism risk, its utility is undeniable. Among 
other things, game theory allows for the analysis of the previously discussed phenomenon 
of threat shifting or target substitution.  Guikema indicates that an area worthy of future 
research is the adjustment of game theory assumptions. 
One commercial terrorism risk model is the AIR Terrorism Loss Estimation 
Model developed by AIR Worldwide Corporation. The predominant commercial 
terrorism risk model was developed by Risk Management Solutions (RMS). Gordon Woo 
is called “the chief architect of the RMS terrorism model” in the RMS publication 
Managing Terrorism Risk.11  This publication indicates that RMS calculates insurance 
losses attributable to terrorist attacks using extensive high resolution U. S. building data 
combined with event based models, including explosion modeling, dispersion modeling, 
disease modeling, business interruption modeling, and casualty modeling.  In “Terrorism 
Risk Modeling for Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection,” Willis et al. 
recommend that DHS should “consider investing in the extensions of [the RMS] 
insurance-industry model…to improve the usefulness of this approach to homeland 
security analyses.”12 
As previously mentioned, while game theory can be used to model potential 
terrorist actions, current models assume that both defenders and attackers (terrorists) hold 
Consistently Aligned Beliefs and have complete Knowledge of the Rules. Neither 
assumption is true and improvements in terrorism risk analysis using game theory will 
only occur through development of models with assumptions that more closely match 
real world situations concerning terrorists’ state of mind.  Both the AIR Terrorism Loss 
Estimation Model and the RMS terrorism risk model were developed by the insurance 
industry in their quest for profit.  These models provide a useful starting point, but will 
require significant work to shift their emphasis from commercial insurance calculations 
toward terrorism risk assessment. 
                                                 
11
 Risk Management Solutions, Managing Terrorism Risk (Newark, CA: Risk Management Solutions, 
2003), Risk Management Solutions, http://www.rms.com/publications/terrorism_risk_modeling.pdf 
(accessed January 28, 2008). 
12
 Willis et al., Terrorism Risk Modeling, xv. 
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4. Expert Judgment 
Economic incentives have driven insurance companies and other commercial 
entities to conduct risk research, especially in the area of terrorism-related risk.  In “The 
Evolution of Terrorism Risk Modeling,” Gordon Woo states that the insurance industry 
used expert judgment long before using modern computational tools for risk analysis.13  
Using individual expert judgments can be dangerous, as individual experts may not 
always have complete information on a situation. To address this issue, panels of experts 
are often formed to provide more complete information. This introduces a new issue, that 
of aggregating expert opinions. There is a large amount of literature on this panel 
aggregation problem. Linear averaging is a simple way to aggregate expert opinions, but 
does not provide useful aggregation when those opinions are incomplete or incoherent.  
Predd et al. suggest a method to increase the coherence of expert panels in their paper 
“Scalable Algorithms for Aggregating Disparate Forecasts of Probability.” They refer to 
the Coherent Approximation Principle (CAP) created by Osherson and Vardi.  While the 
CAP can be used to increase coherence in expert forecasts, it is extremely 
computationally intensive and, therefore, slow. This is because all events are grouped 
into a single subset. Predd proposes grouping events in subsets of no more than three 
events to reduce computational requirements, while approximating results gained through 
CAP. This is accomplished through selection of event subsets according their logical 
relationships.14  The authors test their algorithm against five data sets to compare their 
results to full CAP aggregate results. They find that it is possible to complete calculations 
within seconds versus hours for full CAP calculations “while achieving competitive 
forecasting gains.”15 
A simpler approach to panel aggregation is proposed by Tastle and Wierman.  
They apply weights to both experts’ assessment of the value of a random variable and to 
                                                 
13
 Gordon Woo, “The Evolution of Terrorism Risk Modeling,” Journal of Reinsurance 10, no. 3 
(2003): 1. 
14
 J. B. Predd et al., “Scalable Algorithms for Aggregating Disparate Forecasts of Probability” 
(Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Information Fusion, Florence, Italy, 2006), 5. 
15
 Ibid., 7. 
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the degree of importance placed on each expert’s opinion.  In their paper “Determining 
Risk Assessment Using the Weighted Ordinal Agreement Measure,” the authors apply 
their approach to Homeland Security Threat Categories, but this approach could 
potentially be applied to other areas, including expert assessment of the probability of 
occurrence of certain events.  When this paper was presented at the 2007 Los Alamos 
National Laboratory Risk Symposium, they indicated that it was rejected by the Journal 
of Statistics and that considerable work would be required before this approach would be 
widely accepted.16  Nonetheless, it will be valuable to consider the utility of this approach 
in the assessment of terrorism risk using expert opinion.  Without assigning numerical 
weights to expert judgment, Gordon Woo follows a similar line of reasoning to that of 
Tastle and Wierman when he outlines the basis for choosing “the most informed 
terrorism experts.”17 
Predd et al. suggest that their scalable algorithm technique to reduce 
computational requirements in the aggregation of expert judgment approaches the 
accuracy of full CAP results by showing that their results from one data set compare 
favorably with full CAP results.  The paper indicates that five data sets were analyzed 
using scalable algorithms.  Unfortunately, the authors only compare results from one of 
the five data sets used.  The validity of scalable algorithms would be better supported 
through a more rigorous comparison of scalable algorithm aggregation results with full 
CAP results.  Tastle and Wierman suggest a technique for weighting Likert categories in 
their proposed process for determining risk assessment, but acknowledge that further 
research is required to assign suitable values to these weights.   
5. Event Trees 
In “Quantifying Insurance Terrorism Risk,” Gordon Woo indicates that an event 
tree “can be used…to estimate the probability that a planned terrorist attack results in a 
                                                 
16
 William J. Tastle and Mark J. Wierman, “Determining Risk Assessment Using the Weighted 
Ordinal Agreement Measure,” Journal of Homeland Security, June 2007, Homeland Security Institute, 
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/newjournal/Articles/displayArticle2.asp?article=157 (accessed January 
2008). 
17
 Woo, “The Evolution of Terrorism Risk Modeling,” 3. 
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notable loss.”18  Event trees are found throughout terrorism risk literature, notably in the 
work of Bilal Ayyub and Niyazi Bakir. Detlof von Winterfeldt is the Director of the 
Homeland Security Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events 
(CREATE).  He uses Project Risk Analysis to create an event tree that can then be used 
to provide insight into actions that can be taken to prevent terrorism.19 
John Harrald et al. use event chains to analyze terrorist attacks on U.S. ports and 
waterways,20 as do James Moran and Dave Cooper in their documentation of Coast 
Guard Risk Assessment and Risk Reduction.21 While the use of event chains simplifies 
the required analysis, it seems that more accurate modeling of terrorism risks could be 
achieved through the use of event trees, and work on creating event trees to describe 
terrorism-related maritime risk would be worthwhile.  As demonstrated by Predd et al. 
there is great potential to reduce computational requirements through adjustments to the 
way in which calculations are made.  Unfortunately, implementing event trees in lieu of 
event chains would also require more data input from field commands on possible 
outcomes for a much larger number of scenarios.  However, this is another source of 
information on terrorist threat shifting that should not be ignored. 
6. Conclusion 
Four sub-literatures were covered in this literature review.  Risk analysis is a well 
developed and broad field of study. Narrowing the focus of this research to several 
                                                 
18
 Gordon Woo, “Quantifying Insurance Terrorism Risk” (working paper. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 2002), 11, Risk Management Solutions, 
http://www.rms.com/newspress/quantifying_insurance_terrorism_risk.pdf (accessed January 28, 2008). 
19
 Detlof von Winterfeldt and Heather Rosoff, “Using Project Risk Analysis to Counter Terrorism,” 
(presented at USC Symposium on Terrorism Risk Analysis, Los Angeles, CA, 2005), University of 
Southern California, http://www.usc.edu/dept/create/assets/002/51845.pdf (accessed January 28, 2008). 
20
 John R. Harrald, Hugh W. Stephens, and Johann Rene van Dorp, “A Framework for Sustainable 
Port Security,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 1, no. 2 (2004), Berkeley 
Electronic Press, http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol1/iss2/12/ (accessed January 27, 2008). 
21
 James Moran, “Maritime Security Risk Assessment Process” (presented at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory Risk Symposium, Santa FE, NM, 2007), Los Alamos National Laboratory,  
http://risk.lanl.gov/site2k7/RS2007Presentations.html (accessed January 27, 2008); Dave Cooper, “How the 
Coast Guard Attempts to Optimize Mission Execution through Risk Reduction Return on Investment,” 
(presented at Los Alamos National Laboratory Risk Symposium, Santa Fe, NM, 2007), Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, http://risk.lanl.gov/site2k7/RS2007Presentations.html (accessed January 27, 2008). 
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aspects of the included field of risk assessment allows the opportunity to examine 
avenues for improving measurement of Coast Guard mission effectiveness in achieving 
homeland security in greater detail.  Terrorism risk assessment requires quantification of 
threat, vulnerability, and consequences. Techniques that allow refinement in the 
assessment of each of these three components will lead to more accurate assessment of 
terrorism risk.  Risk modeling allows the use of probabilistic risk analysis even when data 
sets of previous terrorism events are incomplete.  An examination of the underlying 
assumptions of game theory and determination of the effects of altering these 
assumptions could lead to better risk analysis.  The oldest method of assessing terrorism 
risk is the use of expert judgment, which is now used as an input to probabilistic risk 
analysis, risk modeling, and event trees. While the problem of panel aggregation has been 
exhaustively studied, methods to speed up or simplify aggregation while maintaining or 
enhancing the value of the aggregated expert judgment call for further study.  Finally, the 
event chains currently used by the Coast Guard and others allow assessment of terrorism-
related maritime risk.  However, the development of these event chains into event trees 
has the potential to improve measurement of Coast Guard mission effectiveness, as event 
trees should provide a better approximation of the dynamic nature terrorist attacks.   
While a there are a number of gaps and issues in the literature relating to terrorism 
risk assessment, the area that provides the greatest opportunity for improvement seems to 
be the improvement of expert judgment used by the Coast Guard to assess terrorism-
related maritime risk and to assess the effectiveness of Coast Guard efforts to address that 
risk. 
E. ARGUMENT 
The model used to assess Coast Guard impact on terrorism-related maritime risk 
would benefit from refinement of several components in order to more accurately 
represent Coast Guard effectiveness in reducing this risk.  Those components are: 
analysis of threat shifting combined with improved modeling, properly elicited and 
aggregated expert opinions, and event trees. 
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Terrorism risk analysis defines risk as a function of three components: threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences22 Better threat assessment will improve the risk 
assessment calculated with that threat input. Terrorists adjust target selection based on the 
vulnerability of those targets (threat shifting)23 and use adaptive learning to modify future 
attacks in their quest for success.24 A thorough examination of threat shifting will allow 
improved risk assessment, finally resulting in a more accurate reflection of Coast Guard 
mission effectiveness in achieving homeland security. 
Compared to land-based terrorist attacks, there is a shortage of maritime terrorist 
attack data on which to base risk analysis, but modeling can be used to address this data 
shortfall.  In his monograph The Maritime Dimension of International Security, Peter 
Chalk states, “Indeed, according to the RAND Terrorism Database, strikes on maritime 
targets and assets have constituted only 2 percent of all international incidents over the 
last 30 years…[nonetheless] there has been a modest yet highly discernible spike in high-
profile terrorist incidents at sea over the past six years.”25 This includes attacks on the 
French oil tanker Limburg and the Philippine SuperFerry 14, along with numerous 
attacks by the Tamil Tigers on Sri Lankan naval vessels.  The maturation of the models 
used to arrive at the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Outcome Measure will allow 
more accurate assessment of terrorism-related maritime risk so that the Coast Guard can 
improve homeland security effectiveness measurement. 
Expert opinions can be used to assess terrorism risk, and if numerous expert 
opinions are properly aggregated, the resultant risk assessment will be more accurate than 
that arrived at through consideration of only one information source. Current Coast 
Guard assessment of terrorism risk is achieved by considering expert opinions generally 
                                                 
22
 Henry Willis et al., Estimating Terrorism Risk, xvi. 
23
 Falaschetti and Roberts, “Threat Shifting.” 
24
 Gordon Woo, Understanding Terrorism Risk, (Newark, CA: Risk Management Solutions, 2002), 7, 
Risk Management Solutions, 
http://www.rms.com/Publications/UnderstandTerRisk_Woo_RiskReport04.pdf (accessed January 28, 
2008). 
25
 Peter Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges 
for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 19-20, RAND Corporation, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf (accessed February 9, 2009). 
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within the Coast Guard. Measurement of homeland security effectiveness will be 
significantly improved through inclusion of outside experts in addition to Coast Guard 
opinions and by considering the use of advanced panel aggregation techniques to provide 
the best input on the Reduction in Terrorism-Related Maritime Risk outcome measure. 
The Coast Guard Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Outcome Measure can 
be improved through the use of improved threat shifting, inclusion of outside experts and 
improved expert judgment, and maturation of models to more accurately depict terrorism-
related maritime risk and Coast Guard impact on that risk. 
Potential issues or challenges include the difficulty of constructing event trees to 
replace the current event chains, collecting better source data from a larger number of 
sources, and then mobilizing the resources to complete the computations in a timely, yet 
accurate manner so as to accurately assess terrorism risk.  However, none of these issues 
are insurmountable.  Research into terrorist threat shifts will provide insight to more 
accurately model terrorist activities during attacks, streamlined reporting techniques will 
allow the collection of more expert opinions without a significantly greater burden on 
those providing those opinions, and the use of computational techniques to reduce 
required processing time while maintaining a comparable level of accuracy will permit 
the swift processing of much larger data sets. 
F. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II of this project reviews guidance from the General Accountability 
Office on risk management framework and provides an overview of the Coast Guard 
risk-based decision-making guidelines.  In addition, it contains information from a 
number of sources on the terrorism risk assessment, an important component in both the 
risk management framework and the risk-based decision-making guidelines.  Chapter III 
examines the data sources used in the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) 
outcome measure, the structure of the model, and the mechanics of how the model 
determines the value of the measure.  Chapter IV describes the research methodology and 
reviews the qualitative data collection results, pointing out areas of convergence and 
divergence between the experts consulted.  Chapter V points out the need for outside 
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input to the PWCS Outcome Measure and suggests a number of potential contributors to 
the assessment of Coast Guard effectiveness in reducing the risk of maritime terrorism.  It 
also considers issues that adversely affect expert judgment, ideas to address these issues, 
and concludes with an appraisal of various methods of expert judgment aggregation.  
Chapter VI presents a summary of recommendations for improvement to the PWCS 
outcome measure, an implementation plan and recommendations for future research, and 
conclusions. 
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II. MARITIME TERRORISM RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
ASSESSMENT 
A. BACKGROUND  
As the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security, the Coast Guard is 
responsible for deploying its personnel and platforms so as to obtain the maximum 
reduction in the risk of maritime terrorism.  From its beginnings as the Revenue Cutter 
Service in 1790, the Coast Guard has played an integral part in “protecting the coast, 
trade, and maritime interests of our nation.”26 Three previous pieces of legislation laid the 
foundation for the Coast Guard Port Security mission. 
1. The Espionage Act, Magnuson Act, and Ports and Waterways Safety 
Act 
On July 30, 1916, German saboteurs set fire to a boxcar full of explosives at 
Black Tom Island in Jersey City, New Jersey.  The U.S. had started to support the Allied 
Powers in World War I and allowed the purchase of U.S. ammunition as long as it was 
not carried to Europe in American vessels.  Much of this ammunition passed through the 
Jersey Central Railroad Terminal on Black Tom Island.  The sabotage caused over $40 
million in damage to the facility and to buildings throughout Northern New Jersey, 
Manhattan, Staten Island, and Brooklyn.  This catastrophe prompted passage of the 
Espionage Act of 1917 and placed the Coast Guard in charge of port security to regulate 
vessels in U.S. waters during national security emergencies.  The Korean Conflict and the 
“Red Scare” both started in 1950.  That same year, Congress passed the Magnuson Act.  
This expanded Coast Guard authority to cover harbors, ports, and waterway facilities.  
Due to several large oil spills and vessel groundings, Congress enacted the Ports and 
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 Robert Scheina, “The U.S. Coast Guard at War: A History,” U.S. Coast Guard, 
http://www.uscg.mil/History/articles/h_CGatwar.asp (accessed November 11, 2007). 
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Waterways Safety Act of 1972.  This further expanded the Coast Guard’s Espionage and 
Magnuson Act authorities to cover peacetime maritime safety.27 
2. The Maritime Transportation Security Act and the Security and 
Accountability for Every Port Act 
The Coast Guard role in port security was greatly enlarged by Congress in 
response to the attacks on USS COLE, of 9/11 and against the French tanker Limburg 
that urgently indicated the need for greater oversight of the maritime domain to protect 
the U.S. population and economy.  Recent legislation concerning the Coast Guard’s role 
in maritime homeland security include the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 
(MTSA) and the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port 
Act).  This legislation combined with guidance from the Department of Homeland 
Security provides direction for the Coast Guard to assume the role “as the “lead federal 
agency” and/or “executive agent for maritime security” as indicated in the Coast Guard 
Combating Maritime Terrorism Strategic and Performance Plan.28 As such, the Coast 
Guard is charged with reduction of the risk of maritime terrorism, and the General 
Accountability Office (GAO) has provided specific recommendations on this issue. 
B. GAO RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
The GAO risk management framework was published in the 2005 report, “Risk 
Management: Further Refinements Needed to assess Risks and Prioritize Protective 
Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure.”  This framework was created since 
there “is no established universally agreed upon set of requirements or processes for a 
                                                 
27
 Dennis Bryant, “Port Security: A Historical Perspective,” Marine Link (March 8, 2004), 
http://www.marinelink.com/Story/Column:+Port+Security:+A+Historical+Perspective-13883.html 
(accessed November 28, 2007). 
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 Brian M. Salerno, Combating Maritime Terrorism Strategic and Performance Plan (Washington, 
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risk management framework specifically related to homeland security and combating 
terrorism.”29  It is shown in Figure 1 and contains five phases: 
1. Strategic goals, objectives, and constraints, 
2. Risk assessment, 
3. Alternative evaluation, 
4. Management selection,  
5. Implementation and monitoring. 
 
Figure 1.   GAO Risk Management Framework30 
                                                 
29
 Margaret Wrightson, Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective 
Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2005), 100, U.S. Government Accountability Office, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0691.pdf 
(accessed January 27, 2008). 
30
 Norman J. Rabkin, Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles in Homeland Security, 
(statement to U.S. House of Representative Committee on Homeland Security. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-904T, 2008). Committee on Homeland Security. 
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20080625151226-90211.pdf (accessed January 27, 2008). 
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The strategic goals, objectives, and constraints phase uses the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 as a source of evaluation criteria.  The elements of 
this phase include a clear delineation of the desired end state, a “hierarchy of strategic 
goals, subordinate objectives, and specific activities to achieve results,”31 creation of 
“priorities, milestones and outcome-related performance measures,” and “limitations or 
constraints that affect outcomes.”32  The Coast Guard Combating Maritime Terrorism 
Strategic and Performance Plan address each of these components. 
The second phase is risk assessment, which requires identification of the sources 
of risk, and quantification of that risk.  The Coast Guard Maritime Security Risk Analysis 
Model is used by each Coast Guard Captain of the Port to conduct a local risk 
assessment, which is combined with results from other ports to compile a national 
maritime security risk assessment. 
The third phase is the alternative evaluation, which uses the risk assessment to 
provide information on the scenarios and targets with the highest risk.  This is used to 
identify countermeasures that are then assessed for their expected effectiveness and 
subjected to cost-benefit analysis.  In addition to agency countermeasure implementation 
costs, opportunity costs imposed by the countermeasures must be considered.  The Coast 
Guard Combating Maritime Terrorism Strategic Risk Model is used to evaluate 
alternatives for maritime terrorism risk reduction. 
The fourth phase is management selection, informed by the alternative evaluation 
and resource availability.  The decisions on strategy implementation made during this 
phase depend on management value judgments of risk tolerance and the desired risk 
reduction profile; should risk reduction measures focus on a few of the highest threat 
targets, or should they be spread as widely as possible? 
The final phase is implementation and monitoring of the management selection to 
achieve the results identified in the strategic goals, objectives, and constraints phase.  The 
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effectiveness of chosen countermeasures must be assessed through testing or exercises 
and measured at the local level.  Unintended consequences must also be identified and 
addressed in this phase.   
C. RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 
The Coast Guard was formed in 1915 as a combination of the Revenue Cutter 
Service and the Lifesaving Service.  The Lighthouse Service became part of the Coast 
Guard in 1939, and in 1942 the Navigation and Steamboat Inspection Service was added.  
All of these agencies played a part in maritime risk management, which the Coast Guard 
continues to this day.  Through the years, service personnel have worked to reduce threat 
through protection executed with security patrols and other actions, to reduce 
vulnerability through prevention accomplished by regulating maritime activities, and to 
reduce consequences through timely response and recover actions during search and 
recue operations. 
Coast Guard experience with risk management was combined with risk 
management theory and codified in a comprehensive document in the 1997 edition of the 
Coast Guard Risk-Based Decision Making Guidelines.33 The guidelines use a process 
that is similar to the GAO risk management framework and contain four steps shown in 
Figure 2 that occur in sequence but allow for feedback throughout the process between 
each step and also allow feedback through a separate risk communication step: 
1. Frame the decision structure, 
2. Complete the risk assessment, 
3. Conduct risk management, 
4. Implement impact assessment. 
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 Joseph Myers, “Risk-Based Decision Making,” Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security 
Council 64, no. 1 (2007): 6-9. 
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Figure 2.   Risk-Based Decision-Making Process34 
Roughly analogous to the strategic objectives, outcomes, and constraints phase of 
the risk management framework is the decision structure step in the guidelines.  The 
problems that are to be addressed through the process are identified, which is basically an 
identification of the strategic goals and outcomes.  Influencing factors are also delineated 
in this step and correspond to identification of constraints. 
Both models contain a risk assessment step. The risk-based decision-making 
guidelines include an extensive list of available risk assessment tools, including pareto 
analysis, checklist analysis, relative ranking/risk indexing, preliminary risk analysis, 
change analysis, what-if analysis, failure modes and effects analysis, hazard and 
operability analysis, fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, event and causal factor 
charting, and preliminary hazard analysis. The guidelines include recommendations on 
when and how to use each tool with examples of how to use the tools. 
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The risk management step of the guidelines encompasses both the alternative 
evaluation and management selection of the GAO risk management framework.  This 
step uses the results of the risk assessment to provide information to decision makers on 
risk management options.  The Coast Guard policy and procedures for Operational Risk 
Management provides a list of five potential risk control options.35 Once all risk control 
options are analyzed, then recommendations are made to senior leadership and a 
management selection is made. The risk control options include: 
1. Spread out the risk. This is accomplished by spreading out the activity 
over time or space. 
2. Transfer the risk. Risk transfer is accomplished by enlisting the assistance 
of other entities who can assume some of the risk through contracts or 
partnerships. 
3. Avoid the risk. It may be possible to avoid some port security risks by not 
allowing certain vessels or cargoes into the port.  However, in addition to 
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security mission, the Marine Safety 
mission drives the Coast Guard to facilitate commerce, so it is very rare 
that the Coast Guard would take such an action. 
4. Accept the risk. If the cost-benefit calculations indicate other 
organizational risk reduction investments should be made first, then the 
most appropriate course of action may be to accept the risk in the analyzed 
case. 
5. Reduce the risk. This can be accomplished through application of Coast 
Guard and other resources to reduce the threat, vulnerability, or 
consequences. 
Finally, impact assessment in the guidelines includes the same activities as 
implementation and monitoring in the risk management framework. 
Throughout each step of the risk-based decision-making guidelines is the 
requirement to initiate and continue risk communication with stakeholders, customers, 
suppliers who may be affected by the operations to gather information for the risk 
assessment and to cultivate buy-in for the eventual Coast Guard decision. 
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D. RISK ASSESSMENT 
Before one can assess risk, the term “risk” must be defined.  Robert Ross cites 17 
different definitions for risk in his paper “Risk and Decision-Making in Homeland 
Security,” including the three risk assessment questions posed by Kaplan and Gerrick: 
1. What can go wrong? 
2. What is the likelihood that it would go wrong? 
3. What are the consequences?36 
Although there are numerous variations, most definitions state that risk is a 
function of the probability of the occurrence of an unwanted future event and the 
consequences of that event. 
Risk = f(Probability, Consequences) 
Ross states that “risk, no matter how well founded in reality, is a mental and 
emotional construct rather than a physical reality.”37 The subjectivity of risk is seen in the 
preceding definition by the inclusion of the word “unwanted.”  There are many events 
which are wanted by one party and unwanted by another party; a germane example would 
be the success or failure of a maritime terrorist attack. 
1. System Definition 
The response to the first question, “What can go wrong?” requires an 
examination, definition, and delineation of the system within which the Coast Guard is 
operating and wishes to reduce risk.  Three applicable activities outlined by Bilal Ayyub 
to define a system for subsequent risk assessment are: 
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1. Define the goal and objectives of the analysis. 
2. Define the system boundaries. 
3. Define the success criteria in terms of measureable performances.38 
The goal and objectives of any risk assessment should be to ascertain potential 
sources of risk in the system with the goal of reducing the risk to an acceptable level.  
Defining the system boundaries will restrict the area of consideration for the risk 
assessment to enable an in-depth consideration of applicable issues and factors.  Finally, 
defining success criteria should also result in the identification of failure criteria.  Failure 
in the prevention of terrorism can be defined as an attack that results in damage to the 
intended target.  Failure scenarios that describe potential attacks should be created at this 
point for later assessment. 
2. Probability 
To answer the question “What is the likelihood that it would go wrong?” one 
needs to consider the components of probability of the occurrence of a given event.  In 
the field of terrorism risk assessment, this probability can be broken down into a function 
of threat and vulnerability: 
Probability = f(Threat, Vulnerability) 
The combination of this equation for probability with that above for risk results in 
risk being a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequences: 
Risk = f(Threat, Vulnerability, Consequences) 
3. Threat 
Threat can be further broken down into a function of terrorist capability and 
intent:  
Threat = f(Capability, Intent) 
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Terrorist capability is defined as the ability of the adversary to conduct an attack.  
This depends on resource availability, including trained and willing personnel, 
operational equipment, funding and logistical networks to plan, support and execute an 
attack.  Terrorist intent is the intention of a terrorist to conduct an attack.  Information on 
both capability and intent can be gained through intelligence collection and processing. 
In “Estimating Terrorism Risk,” Willis et al. develop the equations above to 
quantify risk.  Willis states that threat can be quantified as “The probability that a specific 
target is attacked in a specific way during a specified time period.”39  
Threat = P(attack occurs) 
4. Vulnerability 
Vulnerability to a terrorist attack is a measurement of the likelihood of a 
successful attack from the terrorists’ point of view.  This will depend on the scenario 
under consideration along with the security systems in place to defend against a 
successful terrorist operation.  Willis states that vulnerability can be quantified as “The 
probability that damage (where damages may involve fatalities, injuries, property 
damage, or other consequences) occur, given a specific attack type, at a specific time, on 
a given target.”40 
Vulnerability = P(attack results in damage | attack occurs) 
5. Consequences 
The final question is “What are the consequences?”  Willis states that 
consequences can be quantified as “The expected magnitude of damage (e.g. deaths, 
injuries, or property damage), given a specific attack type, at a specific time, that results 
in damage to a specific target.”41 
Consequences = E(damage | attack occurs and results in damage) 
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6. Risk Quantification 
Combining the three equations developed by Willis results in the following 
definition of risk for a specific target: “the expected consequence of an existent 
threat…for a given target, attack mode, and damage type.”42 
As above, risk is a function of threat, vulnerability and consequences, but Willis’ 
equations allow one to quantify that risk: 
Risk = Threat * Vulnerability * Consequences 
Risk = P(attack occurs) 
* P(attack results in damage | attack occurs) 
* E(damage | attack occurs and results in damage)43 
One of the main reasons for terrorism is to achieve political ends through the 
creation of fear in the country under attack.  Since this often does result, the assessment 
of the consequences of terrorism must include more than a tally of the immediate 
physical damage of a particular attack. Immediate outcomes could include the destruction 
of a building or the death of targeted personnel and/or innocent bystanders. Long-term 
outcomes could include disruption of the delivery of utilities and other aspects of critical 
infrastructure or loss of faith in one or more segments of the economy (such as aviation).  
These long-term outcomes are estimated through secondary economic affects. 
E. TERRORISM-RELATED MARITIME RISK ASSESSMENT 
1. Port Security Risk Analysis Tool (PSRAT) 
The Coast Guard was tasked with executing the port security mission by the 
Espionage Act of 1917 and the Magnuson Act of 1950. However, Coast Guard records 
contained in the Abstract of Operations database show that only a small amount of 
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resource hours were devoted to ports, waterways and coastal security (PWCS) from 
1998-2000.44 Figure 3 contains a Lowess plot with a break between fiscal year 2001, 
third and fourth quarter (FY01 Q3 and FY01 Q4) which illustrates the jump in PWCS 
resource hours after 9/11.  Because of the need to secure 361 U.S. ports and 95,000 miles 
of shoreline, the Coast Guard applied every available resource to Ports, Waterways, and 
Coastal Security after 9/11.  There was a huge increase which peaked at almost 100,000 
resource hours in the last quarter of 2001.45  Because this level of operations was 
unsustainable, the Coast Guard had to focus resources in areas with the greatest security 
needs. 
 
Figure 3.   U.S. Coast Guard Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security Resource Hours46  
Admiral Allen, who was then the Coast Guard Atlantic Area Commander, 
initiated development of a computer program so each Captain of the Port (COTP) could 
quantify security risk and locate areas with the highest security risk in U.S. ports.  A team 
of employees from Coast Guard headquarters, the Coast Guard Research and  
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Development Center, and ABS Consulting developed the first version of the Port 
Security Risk Analysis Tool to meet these criteria.  The program was fielded in 
November 2001.   
In alignment with numerous risk assessment guidelines, the PSRAT defines risk 
as the product of Probability and Consequence.  Navigation and Vessel Inspection 
Circular 9-02 specifies that:47 
Risk = Probability X Consequence, or R = P X C 
R = risk score for a given security breach 
P = probability - probability of a security breach 
C = consequence - the sum of possible consequences associated with a successful 
security breach. Consequences may be based on impacts to life, economic 
security, symbolic value, and national defense. 
The probability of a security breach can be broken down into the product of threat 
(T) and vulnerability (V).  Threat is defined as the likelihood of attack against a given 
asset or location, and vulnerability is defined as weaknesses in physical structures, 
personnel protection systems, processes, or other areas that may lead to a security breach. 
(NVIC enclosure (3) pages 1-2)  This results in the following formula: 
Risk = Threat X Vulnerability X Consequence. 
The Port Security Risk Analysis Tool provided each COTP the ability to capture a 
local assessment of threat, vulnerability, and consequences of specific attack scenarios 
against assets and infrastructure in the port.48 The risk algorithm within PSRAT 
calculated a relative risk score for each asset or infrastructure, which then allowed the 
COTP to set priorities within that port.  However, estimates of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequences were made on a local level.  The threat components used in PSRAT were 
local intelligence estimates of the potential for attack on each asset or infrastructure 
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within that port.  Wide variations in threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments 
occurred because of local differences and varying levels of rigor required in each COTP 
zone.  While PSRAT provided valuable risk information so individual COTPs could set 
priorities within an individual port, these port risk assessments were not standardized.  As 
a result, it was not possible to compare security risks between different ports, nor was it 
possible to assess overall port security risk within each Coast Guard district, area, or on a 
nationwide basis.49 A new version of PSRAT was released in 2002 which allowed further 
refinement of the consequence components by including the ability to capture the affect 
of mitigation in the form of recoverability and redundancy. 
2. Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) 
In December 2004, the Coast Guard started developing a new program called the 
Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) to build on the foundation and 
experience gained through the use of PSRAT.  This development addressed the issues 
outlined above with PSRAT along with feedback from the General Accountability Office 
and the Department of Homeland Security.  MSRAM uses threat information from the 
Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC), which “provides strategic 
intelligence support [and] serves as the Coast Guard's primary interface with the 
collection, production, and dissemination elements of the national intelligence and law 
enforcement communities.”50 The ICC threat assessment separates terrorist intent and 
capability, and it also provides threat estimates for each attack scenario against each type 
of target contained in the model. In addition, the new program drives consistency in 
vulnerability and consequence assessments through user training, a help desk, 
recommended ranges for factor scoring and benchmark data, and a review process to 
identify anomalies and outlier data. Vulnerability assessments are linked to specific target 
attributes and include specific guidance for scoring interdiction capabilities of the 
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owner/operator, local law enforcement, and the Coast Guard. Consequence assessments 
have been revised in an attempt to achieve equivalency between death/injury, economic 
losses, environmental impacts, national security degradation, and symbolic damage to 
national landmarks.  The new model also considers the secondary economic impact of 
terrorist attacks.  Additional consistency is gained through the requirement to assess the 
same terrorist attack scenarios in each port, while allowing the ability to analyze optional 
scenarios.51  The field level risk assessment data collection with MSRAM was initiated in 
February 2006, and data collection continues on an annual basis.  In addition, MSRAM 
has been updated to incorporate improvements suggested by field units and headquarters 
personnel, especially the recently added blast calculator, which allows better estimation 
of the consequences of maritime terrorism to improve risk assessment. 
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III. THE COMBATING MARITIME TERRORISM 
STRATEGIC RISK MODEL 
A. BACKGROUND  
The Coast Guard Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) outcome 
measure is arrived at in two steps. The first step is an assessment of the risk of maritime 
terrorism arrived at through the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM), an 
assessment of the risk level within each Coast Guard Captain of the Port Zone. This 
provides the raw risk level, assuming no Coast Guard activity to prevent terrorism. The 
second step is an assessment of the effectiveness of Coast Guard activities designed to 
prevent, protect, respond, and recover from maritime terrorism. This is accomplished 
through the construction of potential maritime terrorist attack scenarios and an 
assessment by Coast Guard experts on the probability of failure of Coast Guard activities 
to prevent a successful terrorist attack in each scenario. This assessment is used in the 
Combating Maritime Terrorism Strategic Risk Model (called the LROI model) to 
calculate the risk reduction achieved by the Coast Guard, which is reported as the PWCS 
outcome measure. The LROI model was created by ABS Consulting in conjunction with 
personnel from Coast Guard headquarters in 2005. 
B. RISK QUANTIFICATION 
As outlined in Chapter II, Kaplan and Gerrick pose three risk assessment 
questions which guide the quantification of risk. This chapter will review how each of 
these three questions are addressed in MSRAM and the LROI model. Then it will 
examine the data sources used in the models and how the LROI model determines the 
value of the PWCS outcome measure.   
1. Question 1: What Can Go Wrong? 
Responding to the first risk assessment question: What can go wrong?” requires 
one to define and delineate the system within which operations are conducted as the first 
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step to reduce risk. The Coast Guard does this by defining 15 different maritime terrorism 
scenarios in three overall groups: transfer, direct attack, and exploitation.  Each of these 
scenarios is within the maritime domain which the Coast Guard is charged protecting in 
its role as lead federal agency for maritime homeland security.  The definitions below are 
taken from the Coast Guard Combating Maritime Terrorism Strategic and Performance 
Plan.  Two groups of direct attack scenarios (vessels and facilities) are included so that 
the list below matches the numbering system in the LROI model. 
Transfer – Includes the transfer of terrorists and/or weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) into the United States where exploited vessels en route from foreign countries 
are used as a means of conveyance. 
1. Vessels/Transfer of Terrorists: Transfer of terrorist(s) into the United 
States with the intent and capability to carry out terror attacks within the 
United States where exploited vessels en route from foreign countries are 
used as a means of conveyance. 
2. Vessels/Transfer of WMD: Transfer of WMD (e.g., chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear) into the United States to support ongoing terrorist 
operations where exploited vessels en route from foreign countries are 
used as a means of conveyance. 
Direct Attack – Includes various attack modes and/or weapons against identified 
high value and/or critical targets.  Targets may be vessels of various types. 
3. Vessels/Waterside Attack: Waterborne explosive attacks against high-
value vessels or barges.  This scenario does not include subsurface attacks 
such as mines or swimmer/diver attacks. 
4. Vessels/Shoreside Attack: Shoreside explosive attacks delivered against 
high-capacity passenger vessels (e.g., passenger ferries, cruise ships, and 
RO/RO ferries). 
5. Vessels/Aircraft Attack: Independently obtained private aircraft for use in 
a suicide-style attack against vessel/barge.  Plane size limited by what one 
individual can commercially obtain and pilot. 
6. Vessels/Stand-off Weapons: A weapon fired from a short distance at a 
moored or moving vessel. 
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7. Vessel/Chemical Biological Radiological (CBR): Delivery of CBR 
materials against a high-capacity passenger vessel (e.g., passenger ferries, 
cruise ships, and RO/RO ferries). 
8. Vessel/Sub-Surface Attack: Subsurface explosive attacks delivered against 
high-value vessels or barges. 
Exploitation – Includes terrorists taking control of a vessel of opportunity to be 
used as a weapon against other maritime targets; potential targets are other vessels and/or 
facilities/infrastructure. 
9. Vessel/Exploitation/Internal Forces: Internal forces taking control of a 
vessel of opportunity to be used as a weapon against other targets. 
10. Vessel/Exploitation/External Forces: External forces taking control of a 
vessel of opportunity to be used as a weapon against other targets. 
Direct Attack – Includes various attack modes and/or weapons against identified 
high value and/or critical targets. Targets may be maritime related 
facilities/infrastructure. 
11. Facilities/Waterside Attack: Waterborne explosive attacks delivered on a 
subset of high-value facilities/infrastructure/key resources. 
12. Facilities/Shoreside Attack: Shoreside explosive attacks delivered against 
facilities/infrastructure/key resources. 
13. Facilities/Aircraft Attack: Independently obtained private aircraft for use 
in a suicide-style attack against facility/infrastructure/key resources.  Plane 
size limited by what one individual can commercially obtain and pilot. 
14. Facilities/Stand-off Weapons: A weapon fired from a short distance at 
stadiums/airports, Marine Transfer Facilities (MTFs), and Maritime 
Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (MCI/KR).   
15. Facilities/Sub-Surface Attack: Subsurface explosive attacks delivered 
against facility/infrastructure/key resources.52 
The LROI Model uses maritime terrorism risk information from the Maritime 
Security Risk Analysis Model. The 13 direct attack/exploitation scenarios listed above 
are contained within MSRAM, each of which is a combination of an attack/exploitation 
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mode and a specific target class (either vessel or shoreside facility). MSRAM targets 
include vessels and facilities that are maritime critical infrastructure/key resources. The 
model further breaks these down into 62 target classes with associated required scenarios 
for each target class. The two transfer scenarios in the LROI model are not in MSRAM.  
As a result, the Coast Guard conducts annual meetings to acquire information from Coast 
Guard subject matter experts (SME) on the risk of occurrence of these events and the 
estimated effectiveness of Coast Guard activities to prevent the events.  Risk data from 
previous years is provided to personnel who are assessing the risk of transfer of terrorists 
and WMD. Other source data that is considered includes the National Maritime Security 
Risk Profile, the National Maritime Transportation Security Plan risk assessment, and 
information from the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center. The transfer 
scenarios have the highest risk of the 15 scenarios in the LROI model.53 
2. Question 2: What is the Likelihood That It Would go Wrong? 
Answering the question “What is the likelihood that it would go wrong?” requires 
an assessment of the probability of occurrence of an event. As outlined by Kaplan and 
Gerrick, the Coast Guard quantifies this probability by breaking it down into the two 
components shown in the formula below; threat and vulnerability. 
Probability = f(Threat, Vulnerability) 
a. Threat 
Threat is defined as the likelihood of a specific terrorist attack on a 
particular target, which is characterized by the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination 
Center and further broken down into the three factors that are shown below and represent 
intent, capability, and geography. ICC uses the geography factor to account for terrorists’ 
relative preference for attacks in one area vs. another. The formula for threat is:  
Threat = Intent * Capability * Geography54 
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b. Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is defined as the likelihood that a terrorist attack will be 
successful, and MSRAM uses the following information to calculate this value. The 
Coast Guard sector personnel characterize the achievability of each attack scenario in the 
absence of all security measures, which is the probability that terrorists could 
successfully complete that attack. They also assess system security and characterize the 
expected failure rate to interdict the attack with assets of the Coast Guard, other 
government agencies, or the owner/operator. Finally, sector personnel assess target 
hardness or the probability that a given target will fail to withstand an attack.  These 
factors are combined into vulnerability as shown below. 
Vulnerability = Achievability * (1-System Security CG) * (1-System Security OG) * (1-
System Security
 O/O)* (1- Target Hardness).55 
c. Threat Shifting 
As indicated by Woo, “A cornerstone of terrorist targeting is target 
substitution.”56 This phenomenon is also referred to as threat shifting and risk shifting.  
Similar to criminals who focus efforts on the least protected targets within an area of 
interest, terrorists seek maximum damage with minimum energy expenditure.  To this 
end, Al Qaeda and associated jihadist terrorists conduct extensive research on all aspects 
of available targets and execute attacks on those targets that present the lowest level of 
defense. This is evident in numerous instances, including the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) shift from a planned bombing of London to Manchester in response to heightened 
security in the capital, the 2003 attack on the British embassy in Istanbul in favor of the 
more secure American embassy, the 2005 Bali attack on the nightclubs with the poorest 
security, and the Jemaah Islamiyah embassy attack in Singapore instead of a more  
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heavily fortified embassy in the Philippines.57 The MSRAM vulnerability formula above 
takes into account threat shifting by assigning higher risk to targets with higher attack 
achievability, lower system security, and lower target hardness. 
3. Question 3: What are the Consequences? 
Both the primary and secondary consequences are calculated in MSRAM.  This 
requires an assessment by each COTP of the level of impact associated with a successful 
attack. The primary consequence characterization includes five categories: the expected 
number of deaths or injuries; the primary economic impact made up of expected property 
damage and business interruptions; environmental impact, defined by the number of 
barrels of oil or hazardous material spilled; national security impact of the attack, or 
measure of degradation in the U.S. ability to respond to a theater/regional crisis; symbolic 
impact, quantifying damage to landmarks. In addition, the consequence calculation 
includes an assessment of response capability of the Coast Guard, other government 
agencies, or the owner/operator which results in consequence reduction. The calculation 
for primary consequence is: 
Consequence primary = [Death/Injury + Economic primary + Environmental + Nat’l 
Defense + Symbolic] * (1-Response Capability CG) * (1- Response Capability OG) 
* (1- Response Capability O/O)58 
MSRAM aggregates the severity scoring for each of the six aspects of 
consequence to calculate the RIN for each target-scenario pair. 
Secondary consequence is a categorization of the impact of a successful attack on 
the local, regional, or national economy, and considers redundancy and recoverability.  
This is combined with the primary consequences to calculate overall consequences and 
overall risk for each specific scenario – target pair is calculated as shown below: 
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Consequence overall = Consequence primary + Consequence secondary59 
Risk overall = Threat * Vulnerability* Consequence overall60 
4. Event Frequency 
MSRAM data collected by each COTP indicates the relative risk for all 
scenarios—target pairs in that sector. Individual sector data is Sensitive Security 
Information and when more than one sector’s information is collected into a common 
database, it must be safeguarded at the SECRET classification level. This data is 
collected by Coast Guard headquarters into a nationwide database that allows review and 
analysis. However, since the data reflects relative risk information, it cannot be combined 
to reflect national maritime risk. As a result, the Coast Guard translates the relative risk 
data into expected loss by distributing expected attack frequency among all 15 scenarios. 
The Coast Guard headquarters planning team consulted accessible intelligence and 
estimated attack frequency at one direct attack/exploitation every year distributed across 
all 15 scenarios. This distribution is based on the threat level provided by the Coast 
Guard Intelligence Coordination Center and target attractiveness. The issue of threat 
shifting is addressed by assigning more threat to higher value, less protected targets that 
are more attractive to attack. Once this attack frequency is applied to the relative risk 
data, expected losses can be added to calculate the raw risk of each scenario, which is the 
risk level before any Coast Guard intervention. The headquarters planning team 
conducted additional research with the ICC and other sources to estimate the 
frequency of the two transfer scenarios. They arrived at the following frequencies as a 
result of this research: one transfer of terrorists every 10 years and one transfer of 
weapons of mass destruction every 20 years.61 
Mr. Gary Ackerman, Research Director of the National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) recently conducted a survey of 20 
experts concerning the potential for a WMD attack. On the question of the probability of 
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an attack within the next 10 years, the mean probability was 53 percent and the median 
was 50 percent. There was a large standard deviation because of the large amount of 
uncertainty associated with this issue: no consensus formed among the experts. One 
expert estimated the probability at less than 5 percent while others estimated the 
probability at over 90 percent. The responses to successive survey questions indicated 
that “most experts expect the probability of a jihadist WMD attack to rise dramatically 
between 10 and 25 years’ time.”62 While the Ackerman results are not restricted to 
transfer of WMD within U.S. ports, as is the preceding Coast Guard estimate, these two 
estimates of the probability of terrorist activity associated with WMD seem to be of the 
same order of magnitude. This is an area that deserves further examination and update if 
it is to reflect the latest available information. 
5. Risk Ownership 
The Coast Guard portion of risk ownership for each of the 15 scenarios was 
arrived at through consultation with Coast Guard personnel who participated in the 2005 
risk-based PWCS outcome measure effort and is shown in Table 1, Risk Ownership 
Summary. While the Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime homeland 
security, there are a number of other organizations involved with securing U.S. ports 
against terrorism. Because there have been changes in laws, regulations, policies, and 
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6. Risk Reduction Calculation 
LROI uses fault trees to model the risk reduction achieved by Coast Guard 
maritime homeland security activities for each of the 15 scenarios. The same process is 
used for calculation of risk reduction for both direct and exploitation attacks (Scenarios 3 
through 15). This section will review how risk reduction is calculated for a representative 
scenario. Once this is complete, the methodology of risk reduction calculations for 
Scenarios 1 and 2 (Transfer of Terrorists and Transfer of WMD) will be reviewed. 
The LROI model is used to calculate the PWCS outcome measure through the 
following process. Each of the 15 scenarios is associated with several Lines of Assurance 
that have the potential to reduce the risk (threat, vulnerability, or consequence) of that 
particular scenario.  There are 21 Lines of Assurance (LOA) that are made up of one or 
more activities from the complete list of 29 activities conducted to reduce the risk of 
maritime terrorism.  These activities are grouped into three categories shown below. A 
full listing is contained in the appendix, which indicates the linkage between activities 
and Lines of Assurance. It also indicates the risk component that each activity addresses; 
threat, vulnerability, or consequence. Finally, it indicates whether each is an independent, 
dependent, or supporting activity. Independent activities such as patrolling do not require 
intelligence cuing to succeed, as the assets executing these activities are already on scene. 
Dependent activities, such as investigating anomalies, are dependent on intelligence 
cuing to prompt execution of the activity to reduce the risk of maritime terrorism. 
Supporting activities include collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence, 
along with other activities that are important to the reduction of maritime terrorism risk 
reduction, but do not directly do so. Coast Guard experts, specializing in each of the three 
categories, assess the probability of success of each of the 29 activities. The three 
categories and corresponding expert areas of specialization are: 
1. Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness – This includes the collection, 
processing, analysis, and production of intelligence, and disseminating 
that intelligence and information.   
2. Lead and Conduct Effective Maritime Security and Response Operations – 
This includes conducting patrols, conducting boardings, and enforcing 
security zones.   
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3. Create and Oversee an Effective Maritime Security Regime – This 
includes review, approval and enforcement of vessel and facility security 
plans, and execution of the International Port Security Program.64 
LROI combines the failure probability (1-effectiveness) for each activity to 
calculate the failure probability of the LOA. Then the failure probabilities of all LOAs 
that may stop a particular scenario are combined to calculate the risk reduction that the 
Coast Guard can achieve for that scenario. Finally, LROI combines the risk reduction 
achieved across all scenarios to arrive at the final PWCS outcome measure. The 
following sections will illustrate the process used to calculate risk reduction for direct 
attack and exploitation using Scenario 4 as an example and will examine the same 
process for transfer of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. 
a. Calculation of Risk Reduction for Direct Attack and Exploitation 
Figure 4 is the fault tree for scenario 4, Shoreside Attack against Vessel. 
This fault tree shows the overall success probability for this scenario that the Coast Guard 
will succeed in reducing the risk of maritime terrorism through any one of the seven 
Lines of Assurance shown in Figure 4 (see below). This is represented by the “or” gate at 
the top of the fault tree.  Line of Assurance F depends on successful intelligence cuing to 
prompt Activity 16, Investigate Anomalies, and this is shown in the fault tree by an “and” 
gate between the intelligence activities (Activities 3 and 4) and Activity 16, Investigate 
Anomalies.  This means that no risk reduction will be achieved unless intelligence cuing 
is received in time to investigate anomalies. One step further down in the fault tree is the 
“or” gate between Activities 3 and 4, signifying that intelligence cuing can come from a 
source either inside or outside the Coast Guard. Line of Assurance M, Intervene by 
Specialized Use of Force, also requires intelligence cuing.  This means that Activity 18, 
Specialized Use of Force, requires intelligence cuing to be effective.  Since they are made 
up of independent activities, none of the other five Lines of Assurance in Scenario 4 
require external intelligence cuing, so the probability of effectiveness for each of these is 
the same as the underlying activity, as shown in Table 2 following the fault tree. 
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Figure 4.   Scenario 4 Fault Tree, Success Probability 
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Table 2. Scenario 4 Line of Assurance—Activity Map65 
Line of Assurance Activity Psuccess Pfailure 
F - Intervene by 
investigating anomalies 
16 - Investigate Anomalies, 3 – USCG 
Intelligence Cuing, 4 - Non-USCG 
Intelligence Cuing 0.00015 0.99985 
H - Intervene by patrolling 7 - Conduct Waterborne, Shoreside, 
and Aerial Patrols 0.001 0.999 
M - Intervene by 
specialized use of force – 
domestic zone 
18 - Specialized Use of Force - 
Domestic Zone, 3 - USCG 
Intelligence Cuing, 4 - Non-USCG 
Intelligence Cuing 0.00035 0.99965 
U - Intervene by 
owner/operator security 
29 - Review, Approve, and Enforce 
Compliance with Domestic Vessel, 
Facility and Outer Continental Shelf 
(OCS) Facility Security Plans 0.03 0.97 
E - Intervene by fixed 
security zone 12 - Enforce Fixed Security Zones 0.03 0.97 
A - Intervene after attack - 
recovery 25 - Respond to Terrorist Attack 0.03 0.97 
B - Intervene after attack - 
response 26 - Recover from Terrorist Attack 0.03 0.97 
LROI performs calculations on the basis of probability of failure, so the 
effectiveness estimations (Probability of Success = Ps) provided by Coast Guard experts 
are converted to Probability of Failure (Pf) as follows: Pf = 1 - Ps.  From this viewpoint, 
the fault tree for Scenario 4, Shoreside Attack against Vessel, shows that the overall 
failure probability for this scenario that the Coast Guard will fail to reduce the risk of 
maritime terrorism through any one of the seven Lines of Assurance is represented by an 
“and” gate at the top of the fault tree shown in Figure 5 (see below).  The failure of Line 
of Assurance F is contingent upon failure of either intelligence cuing (Activities 3 and 4) 
or Activity 16, Investigate Anomalies. This is shown in the fault tree by an “or” gate 
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between the intelligence activities (Activities 3 and 4) and Activity 16, Investigate 
Anomalies, and signifies that no risk reduction will be achieved if there is a failure in 
either intelligence cuing or action to investigate anomalies. One step further down in the 
fault tree is the “and” gate between Activities 3 and 4, signifying that a failure of 
intelligence cuing occurs when that failure occurs both inside and outside the Coast 
Guard.  Line of Assurance M also requires intelligence cuing, and the failure probabilities 
are calculated using the same logic.  None of the other five Lines of Assurance in 
Scenario 4 require external intelligence cuing, so the probability of failure for each of 
































































































































Figure 5.   Scenario 4 Fault Tree, Failure Probability
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The calculation of failure to achieve risk reduction is as follows: 
Failure of intelligence cuing, “and” gate 
Pfi = PfA3 * PfA4 
Pfi = 0.999 * 0.999 
Pfi = 0.998001 
Failure of Line of Assurance F, “or” gate 
PfLF = 1 – [(1 – Pfi) * (1 – PfA16)] 
PfLF = 1 – [(1 - 0.998001)* (1 - 0.925)] 
PfLF = 0.999855 
Failure of Risk Reduction in Scenario 4, “and” gate 
PfS4 = PfLF * PfLH * PfLM * PfLU * PfLE * PfLA * PfB 
PfS4 = 0.99985 * 0.999 * 0.99965 * 0.97 * 0.97 * 0.97 * 0.97 
PfS4 = 0.884 
This indicates that the probability of failure of all seven Lines of 
Assurance associated with Scenario 4 to reduce the risk of maritime terrorism is 88.4 
percent. Therefore, the overall Raw Risk Reduction Factor (RRrf) achieved by Coast 
Guard PWCS activity in Scenario 4 is 1.0 – 0.884 = 0.116, or RRrf = 11.6%.   
Given a Raw Risk RIN of 1,463 for Scenario 4 results in the following: 
Scenario 4 RR RIN = 1463 
Raw Risk Reduction, RRr 
RRr RIN = RRrf * RR RIN 
RRr RIN = 0.116 * 1463 
RRr RIN = 170 
As indicated in the Risk Ownership Summary (Table 1), the Coast Guard 
Owned Risk Factor (CGORf) for this scenario is 55 percent of the raw risk, or CGORf = 
55%.  This is used to calculate the portion of the risk that is owned by the Coast Guard. 
Coast Guard Owned Risk, CGOR 
CGOR RIN = CGORf * RR RIN 
CGOR RIN = 0.55 * 1463 
CGOR RIN = 810 
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The Coast Guard Owned Risk Reduction Factor is calculated by dividing 
the Raw Risk Reduction by the Coast Guard Owned Risk. 
Coast Guard Owned Risk Reduction Factor, CGORrf 
CGORrf = RRr RIN / CGOR RIN 
CGORrf = 170 / 810 
CGORrf = 21% 
This results in a Coast Guard Owned Risk Reduction Factor for scenario 4 
of 21 percent.  Once Risk Reduction Factors are calculated for each scenario, they can be 
combined to calculate the total risk reduction due to Coast Guard activities, which is the 
PWCS Outcome Measure.  The Coast Guard then uses these results to assess the return 
on investment of each Line of Assurance and underlying activities to inform plans to 
acquire the platforms and bring on the personnel and to execute those activities. 
b. Calculation of Risk Reduction for Transfer of Terrorists and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Scenarios 1 and 2: Calculations of risk reduction associated with the two 
transfer scenarios achieved through Coast Guard activities start out with a 
characterization of the overall risk associated with Transfer of Terrorists or Transfer of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction.  As previously indicated, the overall risk levels of the 
transfer of terrorists or WMD in the maritime domain are estimated through analysis of 
the National Maritime Strategic Risk Profile and the National Maritime Transportation 
Security Plan risk assessment, combined with information from the Coast Guard 
Intelligence Coordination Center.  Each of the two transfer scenarios is subdivided into 
16 sub-scenarios to account for vessel type, crew compliance/non-compliance with Coast 
Guard direction, and level of warning provided concerning arrival of these vessels.  As 
shown below in Figure 6 and Figure 7 (see below), the overall risk for Scenario 1, 
Transfer of Terrorists, is then subdivided among its 16 sub-scenarios, and the overall risk 
for Scenario 2, Transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction, is subdivided among its 16 
sub-scenarios. A fault tree is constructed for each of the 16 sub-scenarios, and risk 
reduction is calculated in the same manner as the previous example, Scenario 4. 
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Scenario 1 - Transfer of Terrorist 
Scenario Vessel Type Compliance Warning 
Raw 
Risk 
      
25% 76 
      Low end  
    
10% 25% 76 
    
Non-Compliant Mid point 




  High end  
  Container 90%   2733 
    Compliant     
      
25% 418 
      Low end   
    
33% 25% 418 
    
Non-Compliant Mid point  








  3391 
  Compliant     
      
25% 51 
20,247 
    Low end   
Risk (RIN)   10% 25% 51 
    
Non-Compliant Mid point  




  High end  
  Passenger 90%   1822 
    Compliant     
      
50% 3796 
      Low end   
    
75% 30% 2278 
    
Non-Compliant Mid point  




  High end  
  <300 GT 25%   2531 
    Compliant     
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 Office of Policy and Planning Integration, “LROI Model.”  
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Scenario 2 - Transfer of WMD 
Scenario Vessel Type Compliance Warning 
Raw 
Risk 
      
25% 839 
      Low end   
    
33% 25% 839 
    
Non-Compliant Mid point  




  High end  
  Container 67%   6813 
    Compliant     
      
25% 559 
      Low end   
    
33% 25% 559 
    
Non-Compliant Mid point  




  High end  
  Non-Container 67%   4542 
    Compliant     
      
25% 42 
33,897 
    Low end   
Risk (RIN)   10% 25% 42 
    
Non-Compliant Mid point 




  High end  
  Passenger 90%   1525 
    Compliant     
      
75% 8580 
      Low end   
    
75% 15% 1716 
    
Non-Compliant Mid point  




  High end  
  <300 GT 25%   3813 
    Compliant     
Figure 7.   Transfer of WMD Scenario Assumption Tree67 
c. Overall Risk Reduction – PWCS Outcome Measure 
The previous two sections described the process used to calculate the risk 
reduction for each of the 15 scenarios. The total reduction in the risk of maritime 
terrorism is found by summing the risk reduction for each scenario, as shown in Table 3 
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 Office of Policy and Planning Integration, “LROI Model.” 
 51
below.  The PWCS Outcome Measure is then found by dividing the risk reduction by the 
Coast Guard owned risk. Each activity is classified as to whether it reduces threat, 
vulnerability, or consequence, so the risk reduction due to reduced threat, vulnerability, 
or consequence can also be calculated. In FY08, the PWCS Outcome Measure indicated 
that Coast Guard activities reduced the risk of maritime terrorism by 20 percent. As a 
result of this performance, the Coast Guard exceeded goals for overall risk reduction, 
threat reduction, and vulnerability reduction. 
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1 - Terrorist Transfer 8755 2541 29% 897 1645 0 10% 19% 0% 
2 - WMD Transfer 14658 1738 12% 641 1098 0 4% 7% 0% 
3 - Vessels/ Waterside 
attack 1836 523 28% 11 257 255 1% 14% 14% 
4 - Vessels/ Shoreside 
Attack 810 170 21% 2 84 84 0% 10% 10% 
5 - Vessels/ Aircraft 
attack 322 107 33% 0 0 107 0% 0% 33% 
6 - Vessels/ Stand-off 
Weapons 673 153 23% 34 60 60 5% 9% 9% 
7 - Vessel/CBR 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0% 0% 
8 - Vessel/Sub-surface 
Attack 469 60 13% 1 20 39 0% 4% 8% 
9 - Vessel/ Exploitation/ 
Internal Forces 1736 317 18% 11 182 123 1% 11% 7% 
10 - Vessel/ Exploitation/ 
External Forces 3808 887 23% 29 590 269 1% 15% 7% 
11 - Facilities/ Waterside 
attack 1503 521 35% 12 165 344 1% 11% 23% 
12 - Facilities/ Shoreside 
attack 6093 1112 18% 10 551 551 0% 9% 9% 
13 - Facilities/ Aircraft 
attack 378 73 19% 0 0 73 0% 0% 19% 
14 - Facilities/Stand-off 
weapons 190 112 59% 5 37 70 3% 19% 37% 
15 - Facilities/Sub-
surface Attack 223 130 58% 5 43 82 2% 19% 37% 
FY08 Grand Total 41454 8444 20% 1657 4732 2057 4% 11% 5% 
FY08 Targets     17%       1% 10% 6% 
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 Matthew Mowrer, “2008 Risk Change and Margin of Error.xls” (internal document, U.S. Coast 
Guard Headquarters Office of Performance Management and Assessment, Washington, D.C., 2008). 
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF COAST GUARD IMPACT ON 
TERRORISM-RELATED MARITIME RISK 
A. METHOD 
The purpose of this research is to conduct a formative evaluation of Coast Guard 
measurement of effectiveness in achieving maritime homeland security that is reported in 
the Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security (PWCS) Outcome Measure.  This thesis:  
1. Examines in detail how the Coast Guard currently measures effectiveness 
in achieving maritime homeland security,  
2. Examines how this measurement could be improved, and  
3. Makes specific recommendations to improve measurement of 
effectiveness in achieving maritime homeland security.  
The focus of this study is to ascertain strengths in the existing Coast Guard 
measurement of effectiveness in achieving maritime homeland security and to point out 
areas for improvement.  The desired result is to improve this measurement by using 
existing Coast Guard expertise and with information from other experts in the field of 
terrorism risk assessment. 
This research examines the mechanisms by which the existing measurement 
program operates and why these mechanisms operate in their current manner.  As such, it 
is a process evaluation of Coast Guard measurement of effectiveness in achieving 
maritime homeland security. 
The Coast Guard’s method for measurement of effectiveness in achieving 
maritime homeland security is prescribed for Coast Guard field units nationwide.  
Interviews were conducted with personnel at Coast Guard and DHS headquarters in 
Washington, D.C., along with personnel on the Coast Guard Pacific Area staff and the 
Eleventh Coast Guard District staff in Alameda, California.  Interviews were conducted 
with those executing Coast Guard policy concerning maritime homeland security and 
with those tasked with measurement of the effectiveness of those policies.  This pool of 
interviewees was chosen in an attempt to cover all levels of the spectrum of personnel 
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involved with the measurement of effectiveness in achieving maritime homeland 
security.  In addition to DHS personnel, the author interviewed personnel at University of 
Maryland National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 
RAND Corporation and American Bureau of Shipping Risk Consulting Division to gain 
the perspective of outside subject matter experts. 
Correspondence and qualitative interviews were used to collect information from 
Coast Guard personnel and outside experts in the field of terrorism risk assessment.  No 
qualitative data was collected by conducting observational fieldwork.  The literature 
review has revealed potential areas to improve measurement of effectiveness in achieving 
maritime homeland security.  The interviews provided expert insight into additional areas 
for improvement from Coast Guard personnel who are using the current metric and from 
risk assessment experts outside the Coast Guard.  Overlaps are identified indicating 
convergence between interviewees, along with differences and dissent indicating 
divergence.  The qualitative data that was collected is reviewed in this chapter and 
successive chapters propose how the Coast Guard can apply that information to improve 
measurement of effectiveness in achieving maritime homeland security. 
Purposeful sampling strategies were used since there is a select group of 
personnel with expertise and involvement in this area of Coast Guard operations.  
Advocates of the existing measurement program were interviewed, along with those who 
propose changes to the current methodology. 
Qualitative data was collected describing how the Coast Guard currently measures 
effectiveness in achieving maritime homeland security.  A preliminary review of Coast 
Guard guidance for this measurement was accomplished before conducting the interviews 
to ensure understanding of current procedures.  This project proposes refinements to the 
metric in question.  Recommendations for maintaining the current metric or transitioning 
to a new metric are addressed in the implementation plan. 
B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND FINDINGS 
Each of the interviewees was asked a similar set of questions, which are listed in 
Table 4, though they evolved through the course of the interview process.  Those ending 
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in “a” refer to questions on the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM), while 
those ending in “b” refer to questions on the PWCS Outcome Measure.  The following 
eight sections of this chapter provide information on responses received from 
interviewees with a listing of important findings focused on improving the PWCS 
Outcome Measure.  The eight sections are linked directly to the eight questions.  The 
chapter concludes with a summary section that highlights the important observations and 
suggestions. 
Table 4. Interview Questions 
Chapter Section Interview Questions 
1. Accuracy of the 
PWCS Outcome 
Measure 
1.b.  Do you think the current measure accurately reflects Coast 
Guard mission effectiveness in achieving homeland security? 
2. Level of Inaccuracy 
of the PWCS Outcome 
Measure 
2.b.  If the current measure does not accurately reflect Coast Guard 
mission effectiveness in achieving homeland security, can you 
characterize the level of inaccuracy to indicate if current measures 
are relatively close, or if they are very far off? 
3. Causes of Inaccuracy 
in the PWCS Outcome 
Measure 
3.b.  Can you explain what you think causes the variance between 
an accurate measure and the Coast Guard’s current measure of 
mission effectiveness in achieving homeland security? 
4. Improving 
Assessment of Maritime 
Homeland Security 
Mission Effectiveness 
4.a.  How do you think the Coast Guard can improve assessment of 
maritime terrorism risk? 
4.b.  How do you think the Coast Guard can improve assessment of 
mission effectiveness in achieving homeland security? 
5. Risk Modeling 
 
5.a.  What impact do you think the use of Risk Modeling would 
have on Coast Guard assessment of maritime terrorism risk? 
5.b.  What impact do you think the use of Risk Modeling would 
have on Coast Guard assessment of mission effectiveness in 
achieving homeland security? 
6. Expert Judgment 6.a.  What impact do you think the use of Expert Judgment would 
have on Coast Guard assessment of maritime terrorism risk? 
6.b.  What impact do you think the use of Expert Judgment would 
have on Coast Guard assessment of mission effectiveness in 
achieving homeland security? 
7. Expert Judgment 
Aggregation 
7.a.  What impact do you think the use of Expert Judgment 
Aggregation would have on Coast Guard assessment of maritime 
terrorism risk? 
7.b.  What impact do you think the use of Expert Judgment 
Aggregation would have on Coast Guard assessment of mission 




Chapter Section Interview Questions 
8. Event Trees 8.a.  What impact do you think the use of Event Trees would have 
on Coast Guard assessment of maritime terrorism risk? 
8.b.  What impact do you think the use of Event Trees would have 
on Coast Guard assessment of mission effectiveness in achieving 
homeland security? 
 
1. Accuracy of the PWCS Outcome Measure 
Opinions on the current PWCS Outcome Measure ranged from a relatively strong 
endorsement of the measure to an expression of concern: “I am skeptical of the existing 
measure of PWCS mission effectiveness because it just seems to be an educated guess.”  
This interviewee expressed concern because of experience participating in an elicitation 
of expert judgment for the PWCS Outcome Measure with only Coast Guard personnel 
present.  One Coast Guard officer stated, “The current measure is not accurate enough… 
[it] shows how we’re doing relative to previous years, but the absolute measure is not as 
precise as desired.”  He offered ideas for achieving better accuracy when responding to 
the subsequent question on improving the measure.  Another officer said, “The accuracy 
or inaccuracy of the measure can be driven by the alpha—the most forceful person in the 
group.”  He went on to discuss this further when addressing the expert judgment 
question.  The most positive endorsement came from a terrorism expert after an initial 
examination of the measure and the expert elicitation process: “The measure does seem 
to reflect actual mission effectiveness well.  It incorporates risk reduction with multiple 
meta-scenarios to cover the threat space; separates threat, vulnerability and consequence; 
and represents layers of defense through prevention and response.”  Several of those 
interviewed were not familiar enough with the measure to offer a view.  Coast Guard 
personnel with the most knowledge of the measure were convinced that it provides good 
information concerning Coast Guard mission effectiveness in achieving maritime 
homeland security in the maritime domain, but also acknowledged the need for 
improvement.  Each interviewee made recommendations for improvement to both the 
assessment of terrorism-related maritime risk with MSRAM and Coast Guard 
effectiveness in reducing that risk with the LROI model.  These recommendations are 
enumerated later in this chapter.   
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2. Level of Inaccuracy of the PWCS Outcome Measure 
When asked to characterize the level of inaccuracy, responses ranged from a 
seemingly overconfident 2.4 percent margin of error to a conservative estimate of within 
an order of magnitude; one officer stated, “It’s probably in the ballpark” and estimated 
the PWCS Outcome Measure is within a 70 percent confidence interval.  An outside 
expert said, “The current measure looks like it is already a relatively good reflection of 
Coast Guard mission effectiveness.”  Everyone who was familiar with both MSRAM and 
the PWCS Outcome Measure voiced the opinion that the risk levels indicated by 
MSRAM were more accurate than the PWCS Outcome Measure, such as: “MSRAM 
provides good data,” and “We have a much better assessment of existing risk levels than 
we do of our effectiveness reducing that risk.”  This is because the current risk level in 
MSRAM is largely based on vulnerability and consequences assessed by local Coast 
Guard personnel with a much higher degree of certainty than the estimated ability of 
Coast Guard activities to prevent maritime terrorism in the LROI model.  MSRAM data 
is collected by personnel at each of the 35 Coast Guard sectors throughout the United 
States and combined to gain understanding of the risk levels in each of those ports.  
MSRAM data includes judgments on the effectiveness of Coast Guard personnel to 
prevent terrorism for some, but not all of the 29 activities that the LROI model uses to 
calculate the PWCS Outcome Measure.  By collecting data on a nationwide basis, there is 
a potential to reduce biases that could adversely affect the PWCS Outcome Measure 
results.  However, to populate the LROI model, the Coast Guard uses unstructured groups 
to acquire data for activities not included in the robust data collection process required for 
MSRAM.  Skepticism concerning the measure came from experience and concerns with 
previous mission effectiveness data collection processes.  As previously indicated, this 
prompted apprehension that the accuracy of the measure could be driven by the most 
forceful person in the group.  These concerns combined with the desire to improve the 
PWCS Outcome Measure prompted additional research into the expert elicitation 
process. 
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3. Causes of Inaccuracy in the PWCS Outcome Measure 
There was a wide range of ideas put forth on the causes of inaccuracy in the 
PWCS Outcome Measure.  One expert stated, “There is no supportable way of measuring 
either the level of maritime terrorism risk, or the Coast Guard capability to reduce that 
risk.  There is no way to measure the outcome.”  However, the expert went on to suggest 
the ways in which the Coast Guard could improve assessment of maritime terrorism risk 
and assessment of Coast Guard activities in reducing that risk. 
As previously mentioned, the PWCS Outcome Measure is based on a preliminary 
assessment of the existing level of risk in the U.S. maritime domain through MSRAM.  In 
reference to MSRAM results, one interviewee stated that “The largest inaccuracy with 
the risk assessment is probably the transfer scenarios [of terrorists and WMD] – neither is 
in MSRAM yet,” though a forthcoming version will include them.  Another interviewee 
said, “The biggest driver of inaccuracy in the current measure is the lack of knowledge of 
the actual capability of the adversary, and lack of knowledge of the actual intent of the 
adversary.  Since threat is a function of capability and intent, this lack of knowledge 
results in imprecise threat estimation, which then provides inaccurate risk estimation.”  
This issue leads to inaccuracy in the PWCS Outcome Measure.   
Specifically addressing concerns with the PWCS Outcome Measure, the 
interviewee went on to indicate, “Another source of inaccuracy is the fact that we are 
making assumptions on the level of intelligence cueing, which then impacts the 
assessment of the reduction in maritime terrorism risk, since many Lines of Assurance 
(LOAs) incorporate assumptions on intelligence cueing and its impact on successfully 
stopping terrorist attacks.”  This was emphasized by another respondent who indicated 
that this lack of knowledge of intelligence cueing is the greatest driver of inaccuracy in 
the model. 
A Coast Guard officer stated that the variance between an accurate PWCS 
Outcome Measure and the current measure “is caused by bias: we think we’re doing 
better than we’re actually doing. We expect results from our labor — we expect Coast 
Guard presence and actions to deter terrorism.”   
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When referring to the assessment of activity effectiveness within the LROI model, 
another officer indicated: 
The variance between an accurate measure and our current measure is due 
to the fact that the Coast Guard is looking at a high level of mission 
effectiveness, for example, the effectiveness of an entire unit such as a 
Marine Safety and Security Team.  To reduce this variance, the Coast 
Guard needs to break down that effectiveness into individual components, 
and then measure those components.  One potential breakdown of 
components is contained in the Coast Guard’s Combating Maritime 
Terrorism (CMT) guidance: ACCCP: Authorities, Capabilities, Capacities, 
Competencies, Partnerships. 
Along a similar line of thought, he also stated, “The Coast Guard needs to gain a 
better understanding of individual components that contribute to reduced maritime 
terrorism risk: weapons, night vision goggles, training, etc.”  Another possibility is to use 
the six facets of readiness: people, equipment, supplies, training, information, and 
infrastructure.  The MSRAM team worked with the Deployable Operations Group to 
measure the effectiveness of various Coast Guard adaptive force packages and could 
provide valuable insight into improving activity effectiveness assessments. 
One respondent offered the following list of causes of inaccuracy in the PWCS 
Outcome Measure: 
1. Lack of validation of a full list of activities that reduce maritime terrorism 
risk. 
2. Lack of mapping [Operation Neptune Shield (ONS)] activities to 
(MSRAM) scenarios 
3. Differences between local and national SME assessment of effectiveness 
in activities that reduce maritime terrorism risk. 
4. Lack of outside SMEs in the process used to assess effectiveness in 
activities that reduce maritime terrorism risk. 
In alignment with Item 2 above, another respondent said, “ONS reporting is based 
on activity, not results, and ONS activities are not directly linked to maritime terrorism 
risk reduction in MSRAM or in reality.” Other interviewees indicated that the poor 
linkage between Operation Neptune Shield activities (ONS), MSRAM Coast Guard  
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activities and the 29 maritime terrorism prevention activities contained in the LROI 
model make it difficult to use ONS and MSRAM information to populate the LROI 
model.   
4. Improving Assessment of Maritime Homeland Security Mission 
Effectiveness 
The first step in improving assessment of maritime homeland security mission 
effectiveness is to improve MSRAM results, and the first step in improving MSRAM 
results is to ensure accurate target lists are available.  One suggestion to do that was “to 
improve targeting of what is of interest from a security standpoint.”  Periodic updating of 
the target lists will ensure the risk assessment is conducted on the facilities and vessels 
that are actually in each Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) Zone. 
A terrorism expert stated that MSRAM: 
…should allow updates with new threats, new targets, and general 
environment updates, including regulatory, physical, etc.  Examples: sea 
level rises by two feet, which causes national security implications.  New 
levees built after Katrina could be new targets which could be blown up 
by terrorists. 
A Coast Guard officer suggested, “One way to improve assessment of maritime 
terrorism risk is to conduct Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) spot checks” 
to populate MSRAM.  This would provide information collected in person on target 
vulnerability and consequence.  He continued:  
Another way is to create ironclad processes for new personnel that are 
using MSRAM to assess maritime terrorism risk.  This would include 
developing job aids for MSRAM and conducting more training to ensure 
that those inputting data are familiar with the program and requirements 
for risk assessment.  An additional concern raised was differences between 
local and national SME assessment of effectiveness in activities that 
reduce maritime terrorism risk.   
These differences would be minimized through the training program described 
above.  In fact, the MSRAM team has a help desk to address field questions on the 
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system, has already created job aids and video training modules and is working to 
implement MSRAM training at several Coast Guard training centers. 
Another Coast Guard officer echoed the drive for more training when he said: 
The best way to improve assessment of maritime terrorism risk is to 
follow the Commandant’s guidance…to institutionalize MSRAM within 
the Coast Guard…By increasing the number of people who are familiar 
with the tool, the Coast Guard will be able to better assess maritime 
terrorism risk, and better use that information to reduce the risk of 
maritime terrorism. 
One respondent stated: “The Coast Guard can improve assessment of maritime 
terrorism risk through improved understanding of threat and consequence.”  Improved 
threat assessments would need to address the lack of knowledge of the actual capability 
and intent of the adversary identified as causes of inaccuracy in MSRAM. 
A further suggestion by a terrorism expert to improve this maritime terrorism risk 
assessment was “to make it more dynamic: get numerical estimates once a year, but 
collect data for future expectations…This would show steady, increasing or decreasing 
risk” throughout the course of the year. 
The expert went on to state: 
The 15 existing scenarios are very good, but the problem is that once you 
define those scenarios, you leave gaps, and adversaries will try and exploit 
[using] attacks not accounted for in the models.  [While the existing model 
allows COTPs to add scenarios to MSRAM], there needs to be an update 
mechanism for the model to update/add/delete scenarios, whether this 
originates with Coast Guard headquarters, COTPs, or intelligence sources. 
This would enable a COTP to account for changing conditions and 
terrorist threat shifts.  The idea is that if one COTP proposes a new 
scenario, then this scenario should be reviewed and potentially used by 
other COTPs. 
Concerning the PWCS Outcome Measure, a Coast Guard officer stated “This 
could be improved by better linkage between ONS activities and maritime terrorism risk 
reduction.”  This sentiment was expressed by several of the interviewees.  This exercise 
should start with a validation of a complete list of activities that reduce maritime 
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terrorism risk, and then create a strong linkage between this list, ONS activities, 
MSRAM, and the LROI model to address the causes of inaccuracy identified above. 
Another officer indicated, “The Coast Guard needs to improve our assessment of 
intelligence cueing for the LROI model.  Current model assumes two percent intelligence 
cueing on attempted terrorist attacks.  The Coast Guard also needs to improve capacity 
estimation/assessment” to more accurately model individual activity effectiveness.  
Assessment of intelligence cueing and capacity assessment were judged the most 
significant drivers of the model so these should be the highest priority for improvement. 
Another recommendation to improve assessment of Coast Guard reduction of 
maritime terrorism risk is to “convene independent Coast Guard groups who would 
assess LOA effectiveness, and then compare and/or combine the results of these groups.”  
The same respondent also suggested that: 
…participation by industry and security professionals in groups assessing 
LOA effectiveness would potentially improve assessment of Coast Guard 
reduction of maritime terrorism risk. However, there are very few industry 
and security professionals who are familiar with Coast Guard capabilities 
to reduce maritime terrorism risk. 
This aligns with the concern raised by another interviewee who cited the “lack of 
outside SMEs in the process used to assess effectiveness in activities that reduce 
maritime terrorism risk.”   
One of the causes of inaccuracy identified above was the bias that originates with 
Coast Guard personnel who “think we’re doing better than we’re actually doing.” This is 
a case of wishful thinking bias, and will be addressed in Chapter V on expert judgment. 
As indicated in response to the previous question, one cause of variance between 
an accurate PWCS Outcome Measure and the current measure is the LROI model use of 
high-level activities to assess maritime homeland security mission effectiveness, and the 
need to disaggregate high level activities into individual components.  For example, 
instead of assessing the effectiveness of the LROI activity “Specialized Use of Force” 
nationwide, better results would be gained by breaking down “Specialized Use of Force”  
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by COTP zone and then into individual components, such as the number of fully mission 
capable small boats with qualified crews, and then assessing the effectiveness of those 
components.   
A terrorism expert indicated, “Dynamic assessment of Coast Guard performance 
in the same manner would improve that assessment in the same manner as [for 
MSRAM].”  This would entail collecting estimates for levels of effectiveness of Coast 
Guard activities to reduce maritime terrorism “once a year, but collect data for future 
expectations” to indicate whether SMEs estimated effectiveness would increase, 
decrease, or maintain existing levels. 
He added that: 
The [LROI] Model links specific Coast Guard activities into Lines of 
Assurance, and then applies those Lines of Assurance against specific 
scenarios.  The issue and danger with the gaps above is that the Coast 
Guard will not take specific action to assess and address scenarios that are 
not defined, and this opens up vulnerabilities in the maritime port security 
system. 
The capability to update scenarios already exists in MSRAM and should be added 
to the LROI model. 
5. Risk Modeling 
The Coast Guard uses two models to arrive at the PWCS Outcome Measure: the 
Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) and the Combating Maritime 
Terrorism model, which as previously indicated, is called the LROI model.   
Most of those interviewed expressed their agreement that additional modeling 
would improve the PWCS Outcome Measure. One respondent stated, “Micromodeling of 
each scenario would improve Coast Guard assessment of maritime terrorism risk.  
Highest risk scenarios should be micromodeled first. Examples of micromodeling include 
the response calculator and blast calculator already in MSRAM.” These additions to the 
model allow calculation of response effectiveness and consequences of various sized 
explosives during the target assessment process and were cited as pertinent examples of  
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improvements that will lead to better risk assessment and, subsequently, better 
performance assessment of Coast Guard activities designed to reduce maritime terrorism 
risk.   
One Coast Guard officer suggested that “Threat shifting could potentially be 
incorporated into MSRAM through target attractiveness” to expand upon the 
vulnerability calculation which is used to account for threat shifting now. 
Another Coast Guard officer indicated, “The Coast Guard needs to use 
independent modeling/calculation of capacity for performance assessment.” This would 
allow more accurate characterization of Coast Guard PWCS capacity based on available 
platforms and personnel to improve performance assessment of maritime homeland 
security mission effectiveness.   
Finally, in reference to modeling, one expert indicated, “This could be good or 
bad, depending on whether the model is good or bad, and whether the data put into the 
model are good or bad.” 
6. Expert Judgment 
All interviewees agreed that expert judgment is critical to both assessment of 
maritime terrorism risk and assessment of effectiveness in reducing that risk.  A terrorism 
expert stated, “The Coast Guard must use expert judgment to assess maritime terrorism 
risk.  Need to elicit the opinions of the right experts and use them in appropriate ways to 
assess threat, vulnerability and consequence.” 
The Coast Guard acquires information on maritime homeland security mission 
effectiveness for the LROI model by gathering input from Coast Guard SMEs. Several of 
those interviewed recommended collecting information on estimated effectiveness of 
Coast Guard maritime homeland security activities from personnel outside the Coast 
Guard with maritime expertise, including Navy SEAL team members and other subject 
matter experts in the area of tactics and their use in protecting against maritime threats, 
tugboat operators, harbor pilots, and others who spend a large amount of time in marine 
environments. These experts could potentially form a Red Cell similar to U.S. Navy 
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SEAL Team Six, which tested the security of U.S. Navy bases.  The proposed Red Cell 
would evaluate Coast Guard maritime terrorism risk reduction activities from the 
perspective of the terrorist mindset.  One terrorism expert said:  
Coast Guard assessment of mission effectiveness could be improved 
through the use of outside experts with similar expertise to the Coast 
Guard experts.  These could, and should include fishermen, America’s 
Cup sailors and others.  This should include people who have experience 
evading maritime security efforts from organizations like the Coast Guard, 
including convicted smugglers and members of Greenpeace and the Sea 
Shepherds.  There is a need to have heterogeneity in the experts who are 
consulted. 
Sources should include government, industry, academia, and the underworld.  
Examples cited the American Association of Port Authorities and other organizations, 
along with people who have experience evading maritime security efforts, such as 
“reformed” or incarcerated terrorists or smugglers.  The need for heterogeneity in experts 
was emphasized as a variety of viewpoints on Coast Guard mission effectiveness should 
reduce bias in the results. 
A Coast Guard officer indicated that “Current Coast Guard guidance requires the 
input of [those outside the Coast Guard] on Area Maritime Security Committees on the 
annual MSRAM data collection process.”  Another Coast Guard officer stated, “Area 
Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) input has improved assessment of risk, especially 
vulnerability since facility and vessel operators know their facilities and vessels best, and 
threat since local personnel are in the best position to know about those who may want to 
attack their facility or vessel.” 
One interviewee said, “In addition to AMSC input, it would benefit the Coast 
Guard to get outside terrorism experts to conduct a headquarters level review of 
calculated risk levels within each port to validate local findings,” while another proposed, 
“Input by subject matter experts in the area of tactics and their use in protecting against 
maritime threats would improve Coast Guard performance assessment.”  This was 
restated by an additional interviewee: “Getting a ‘reformed’ terrorist to assess CG  
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operations would be the best way to improve the assessment of Coast Guard actions to 
reduce maritime terrorism risk. Another way to do this would be to have a Red Cell 
assess Coast Guard operations.” 
An additional issue was raised: “The Coast Guard needs to use expert judgment 
on the quantification of economic consequences (primary and secondary) of attacks on 
Maritime Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (MCI/KR) targets.” 
A Coast Guard officer stated the Coast Guard could benefit from expert judgment 
through the following: “Risk experts could conduct a normative review of the Coast 
Guard process for assessment of maritime terrorism risk and Coast Guard performance 
assessment.” 
Finally, a terrorism expert expressed the concern that “Using previous years’ 
SME estimates of effectiveness as a starting point may save time, but the Coast Guard 
should consider not using these” because this practice introduces anchoring bias into the 
PWCS outcome measure. 
7. Expert Judgment Aggregation 
The Coast Guard currently aggregates expert judgment through consensus of 
unstructured groups for both MSRAM input and to collect data for the PWCS Outcome 
Measure.  A Coast Guard officer familiar with both MSRAM and the LROI model stated: 
We now build consensus between those that are consulted on the 
assessment of maritime terrorism risk.  The use of more sophisticated 
Expert Judgment Aggregation would improve that assessment.  We also 
build consensus on the assessment of Coast Guard impact on maritime 
terrorism risk, and the use of more sophisticated Expert Judgment 
Aggregation would also improve that assessment. 
Another Coast Guard officer argued that Coast Guard efforts should not be 
focused on expert judgment aggregation: “The Coast Guard currently aggregates expert 
judgment through consensus.  At this point it is more important to clearly define maritime 
terrorism scenarios and activities to thwart those scenarios than it is to use expert 
judgment aggregation to assess maritime terrorism risk.” 
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Concerning the PWCS Outcome Measure, a Coast Guard officer indicated: 
The current Coast Guard technique is to get the right group of Coast 
Guard SMEs together to assess Coast Guard capability to reduce maritime 
terrorism risk through a consensus process.  All SMEs have blind spots in 
their judgments.  This consensus process ensures group results are better 
than individual judgments, since SMEs with different areas of expertise 
participate: aviators provide information on aircraft capabilities, cuttermen 
provide information on cutter capabilities, and operations ashore personnel 
provide information on boat capabilities.  There is not really a group of 
overall experts that could independently assess/rate interdependencies 
between the activities in each LOA. 
No single person possesses the depth of knowledge brought together by a diverse 
group of Coast Guard experts in the assessment of interdependent activities that are 
executed in the prevention of maritime terrorism.  Another Coast Guard officer concurred 
with this opinion when he stated: 
Consensus of [the] proper group of Coast Guard SMEs [would be] 
actually better than aggregation of individual judgments,” and “Consensus 
of group of outside experts obtained separately from CG SMEs, and then 
considered in conjunction with Coast Guard SME results would be the 
best way to improve Coast Guard performance assessment. 
One terrorism expert stated, “Linear Averaging is best unless there is a specific 
reason to not use it.  If bias exists, the hope is that responses from separate experts will 
cancel out the bias.”  He went on to state that: 
Another issue with SME probability estimations is that they tend to 
underestimate low probability events and overestimate high probability 
events.  This and other issues can be reduced by SME calibration, multiple 
rounds of elicitation, Delphi studies, and SMEs showing each other and 
analysts the justification for their responses. 
He emphasized the need: 
…to ensure different elicitees don’t understand the question in different 
ways.  Everyone might agree ‘X’ is the most likely outcome, but there is a 
need to have consistent questions to ensure SMEs are responding with 
consistent answers.  One way to deal with this is to ask the same question 
in multiple ways. 
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• Is the chance of dying of cancer 80 percent?  
• Is the chance of not dying of cancer 20 percent? 
If an SME is asked to estimate the probability of the occurrence of a 
particular event in the next 10 years, and provides an estimate of 40%, and 
then is later asked to estimate the probability of the occurrence of the same 
particular event in the next 20 years, any answer other than 80% would be 
inconsistent.  The best way to deal with inconsistent results is to drop data 
from SMEs that provide inconsistent responses.  Another way to deal with 
this issue is to assign less weight to inconsistent elicitees. 
The same terrorism expert went on to say, “Anonymous elicitation is one way to 
avoid groupthink. This can be achieved by placing SMEs in different rooms to remove 
the personal dynamic. Otherwise, the most forceful member will drive the group to his 
own answers.” However, individual elicitation would remove the synergy gained through 
combining personnel with expertise in different areas of Coast Guard and antiterrorist 
operations. This conflict and potential resolution is examined in Chapter V.   
8. Event Trees 
Each of those interviewed indicated expanded use of event trees provided the 
potential to improve the PWCS Outcome Measure. A terrorism expert indicated: 
Event trees can be useful if we are unsure about the threat process or about 
the response/prevention process. They are helpful to ensure we don’t leave 
out important pathways that could lead to maritime terrorism.  Event trees 
could be useful to show potential combinations if there are a number of 
different attack scenarios, targets, and Coast Guard activities that could be 
used to prevent or respond to those scenarios. 
Another expert said event trees:  
…might cause people to think less about point defense and more about 
general security procedures; throughout an entire port or waterway instead 
of just at one facility. This might push people to think about actions that 
could be taken earlier, as they are more effective across more branches of 
the tree, especially intelligence. 
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A Coast Guard officer agreed with the expanded use of event trees when he said: 
This could improve our assessment of maritime terrorism risk by 
accounting for threat shifting.  An example would be terrorist use of a 
diversion (natural or man-made) which would result in Coast Guard 
resources being shifted to the area of the primary event.  Terrorists could 
then attack another area that may normally be covered by those resources.  
This is why it is important for facilities and vessels to have security plans 
and the resources to execute them (private security staffs, etc.). 
The current LROI model uses “modified event trees” which are really event 
chains. While the national threat algorithm in the LROI model accounts for threat shifting 
by assigning a higher frequency of attack to certain targets than others; this phenomenon 
could be more accurately portrayed with event trees.   
C. SUMMARY 
Those interviewed during this research offered a number of suggestions to 
improve both MSRAM and the LROI model.  Those acquainted with both models 
indicated that MSRAM results were likely more accurate than LROI model results used 
to calculate the PWCS Outcome Measure.  Although there was some concern expressed 
about the accuracy of the current PWCS Outcome Measure, the majority of interviewees 
felt the measure in its current form provides a reasonable representation of the level of 
Coast Guard reduction in terrorism-related maritime risk in the United States. 
1. Potential Improvements to MSRAM Include: 
a. Target List Update 
Up-to-date target lists of maritime critical infrastructure/key resources and 
vessels within each COTP Zone to ensure that all targets of interest from a security 
standpoint are included.  This list is already updated annually, but it requires input from 
Coast Guard and AMSC personnel in each port along with a thorough review by district, 
area, and headquarters personnel. 
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b. Threat Updates 
Up-to-date assessments of terrorist intent, capability, and presence to 
conduct direct attacks, exploit vessels for those attacks or transfer terrorists or WMD 
through the maritime domain so that the threat characterization used in MSRAM is as 
accurate as possible. 
c. Vulnerability Updates 
Up-to-date vulnerability assessments: while many components of 
maritime critical infrastructure/key resources have undergone vulnerability assessments, 
these require periodic revisions.  This should include results of MTSA spot checks to 
provide information collected in person on target vulnerability. 
d. Consequence Updates 
Up-to-date consequence assessments: this would require the input of 
engineering and financial experts to assess direct economic impact, as well as economic 
experts to provide information on secondary economic impacts. This should also include 
results of MTSA spot checks to provide information collected in person on potential 
consequences of an attack on a particular target. 
e. Dynamic Risk Component Adjustment 
All three components of risk should get more than an annual adjustment 
even if formal assessments are not made during the course of the year, dynamic estimates 
as to whether threat, vulnerability, or consequence will go up, down, or remain steady in 
the coming year would improve risk assessment.  The Coast Guard Strategic and 
Performance Plan for Combating Maritime Terrorism (CMT 2.0) requires periodic 
MSRAM updates to create an operational risk profile for each COTP zone. 
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f. MSRAM Training and Job Aids/Video Training Modules 
Continued MSRAM training program and updated job aids to ensure that 
Coast Guard field personnel are using MSRAM correctly and to minimize differences 
between local assessments and requirements imposed by review at districts, areas, and 
headquarters. 
g. Scenario Creation 
The ability to create additional scenarios.  While this ability already exists 
within MSRAM, an enhancement would be the capability to gain swift review of new 
scenarios with the intention of passing these scenarios to other COTPs, whether they 
originate with sector personnel, or district, area, and headquarters staffs.  This is to avoid 
the issue of leaving gaps between existing scenarios: adversaries will try to exploit 
attacks not accounted for in any of the scenarios. 
2. Potential Improvements to the PWCS Outcome Measure Include 
a. Intelligence Cueing Assessment  
More accurate assessment of successful intelligence cueing through 
consultation with the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center and other Coast 
Guard intelligence experts to ensure the intelligence cueing levels used in the LROI 
model reflect the best, most up to date estimates available. 
b. Improved Capacity Modeling 
Improved activity effectiveness assessment through better modeling of 
Coast Guard capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from terrorism.  
This can be accomplished through disaggregation of assessments of activity effectiveness 
within the LROI model into individual components.  Several schemes were suggested to 
break down these individual components.  The Coast Guard already collects information 
in the Coast Guard Business Intelligence system using the six facets of readiness (people 
equipment, supplies, training, information, and infrastructure), so that may be a potential 
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structure to put this idea into place.  The MSRAM team may be available to provide 
insight into and assistance with improving activity effectiveness assessments using Coast 
Guard and outside experts. 
c. Activity Alignment 
Alignment between ONS activities, MSRAM, and the LROI model. 
d. Scenario Creation 
The ability to create additional scenarios in the LROI model.  As 
previously stated, this is to avoid the issue of leaving gaps between existing scenarios: 
adversaries will try to exploit attacks not accounted for in any of the scenarios. 
e. Outside Experts 
Inclusion of outside experts in the assessment of Coast Guard 
effectiveness in reducing terrorism-related maritime risk, which will be covered in greater 
detail in Chapter V. 
f. Bias Reduction 
Improved expert judgment through bias reduction, which will also be 
addressed in Chapter V. 
g. Improved Expert Judgment Aggregation 
Improved expert judgment aggregation, addressed in Chapter V. 
h. Dynamic Effectiveness Adjustment 
Dynamic assessment of Coast Guard effectiveness in reducing terrorism-
related maritime risk: collect estimates once each year, but acquire information for 
expected effectiveness levels in the coming year. While the collection of estimates of 
effectiveness for various times throughout the course of the year could help arrive at a 
more accurate PWCS Outcome Measure for various times throughout the year, at this 
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point the results are only used to generate an annual measure that is reported both within 
and outside the Coast Guard for accountability and to support future year funding 
requests.  As a result, this potential change to the PWCS Outcome Measure is not 
recommended. 
i. Event Trees 
The use of event trees to more accurately represent potential terrorist 
actions. As indicated earlier in this chapter, the LROI model uses modified event chains 
to represent the events leading up to and after a terrorist event.  The use of event trees has 
the potential to more accurately represent potential terrorist actions, but development of 
these event trees is beyond the scope of this research. 
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V. EXPERT JUDGMENT 
A. BACKGROUND  
Due to the paucity of data on maritime terrorist attacks and prevention of such 
attacks, the Coast Guard depends on expert judgment to assess both the risk of maritime 
terrorism and the effectiveness of Coast Guard efforts to reduce that risk. The first section 
of this chapter examines existing requirements to incorporate input from outside the 
Coast Guard into the assessment of maritime terrorism risk with special emphasis on the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and Area Maritime Security Committees.  
It continues with recommendations for specific actions to increase outside input on the 
assessment of maritime terrorism risk. The second section of this chapter examines how 
heuristics and biases affect expert judgment in the assessment of annual reduction in 
Terrorism-Related Maritime Risk and ways to improve the assessment of subjective 
probability through bias reduction.  The chapter concludes with an examination of expert 
judgment aggregation.  
B. EXPERT JUDGMENT IN THE ASSESSMENT OF TERRORISM-
RELATED MARITIME RISK 
Expert judgment input from Area Maritime Security Committees in each Coast 
Guard sector has great potential to improve local, regional, and national risk assessments.  
This expert judgment, in turn, will provide additional information that can be used to 
assess Coast Guard impact on the reduction of terrorism related maritime risk.  However, 
there is a need to acknowledge the effect of heuristics and biases, as well as a need to 
take steps to reduce these effects. This section examines requirements concerning outside 
input and systems in place to collect that input. The next section contains three 
recommended methods for gaining this outside input. 
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1. Requirements and Systems to Collect Outside Input on Terrorism-
Related Maritime Risk 
The governing law and regulations concerning Area Maritime Security 
Committees are the Maritime Transportation Safety Act of 2002 (MTSA) and Navigation 
and Navigable Waters regulations at 33 CFR 103.  These direct the Captain of the Port to 
establish an Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC, or committee) made up of 
experienced port stakeholders.  This committee must then ensure completion of an Area 
Maritime Security Assessment, which may be completed by the Captain of the Port, the 
committee, a Coast Guard Port Security Assessment team, or by another third party 
approved by the committee.  While Coast Guard guidance requires consultation with the 
committee during preparation of the Area Maritime Security Assessment, this does not 
occur uniformly throughout the nation. 
In addition to creating Area Maritime Security Committees, the MTSA and Coast 
Guard regulations require each AMSC to “serve as a link for communicating threats and 
changes in MARSEC Levels, and disseminating appropriate security information to port 
stakeholders.”69 Since this can contain Sensitive but Unclassified or Sensitive Security 
Information, the Coast Guard needed to create a secure communication environment 
available to all AMSC members.  In order to provide fast, easy, yet secure information 
access to port stakeholders, the Coast Guard developed Homeport, a secure internet portal 
that fulfills the requirements above.  The system underwent design and vulnerability 
testing in 2004 and was beta tested by several Coast Guard COTPs starting in November 
of that year.  Homeport was deployed service-wide in October of 2005 after alterations 
prompted by field unit input and completion of Coast Guard policy and guidance on its 
use.  To ensure sensitive information remains secure while simultaneously providing 
open access to useful public information, Homeport is divided into secure and non-secure 
areas.  Access to the secure Homeport web portal is only open to owners, operators, and 
security officers of vessels or facilities that are required to submit security plans under 
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MTSA, Area Maritime Security Committee members, Coast Guard personnel working 
with the AMSC, and members of national-level port security related committees. 
An important aspect of Homeport is its alert and warning system, which allows 
swift, secure notification of registered Homeport users with automatic notification of 
receipt to message originators.  This allows Coast Guard COTPs to quickly transmit 
MARSEC level changes and other port security information with automatic receipt 
tracking and retransmission via alternate means if required.  Upon registration, users 
provide email address (primary means of notification), SMS phone number for text 
messages, 24 hour phone number (which will receive text to voice conversion of the 
information), and fax number.  Homeport also gives users access to view vessel and 
facility security plans and MARSEC levels.  Finally, Homeport contains a suite of 
collaboration features which allow users to “work together on projects, set meetings, 
generate tasking, and exchange information about topics of interest within a secure or 
non-secure environment.”70 
2. Recommendations to Improve Maritime Terrorism Risk Assessment 
As stated above, there are already requirements in place to solicit and incorporate 
input from Area Maritime Security Committees into Coast Guard Area Maritime Security 
Assessments.  This does not occur uniformly throughout the service.  The following 
section contains three recommendations to improve maritime terrorism risk assessment 
by making it easier to gain outside input on these assessments so that Coast Guard 
Captains of the Port can use this information while populating the MSRAM database.  
The first method to gain outside input is the use of volunteer Coast Guard Auxiliarists to 
assist with data collection, which has already been accomplished in Sector Northern New 
England and could easily be replicated in other sectors.  The second is expansion of the 
Homeport secure web portal to provide Coast Guard Captains of the Port and their staffs 
the ability to send and receive web based surveys to collect input from port stakeholders 
in conjunction with ongoing communications over the same network.  The third is the 
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implementation of virtual maritime fusion centers as proposed by Detective Candice 
Wright of the Long Beach Police Department in a recent Naval Postgraduate School 
thesis.71  This would link FBI InfraGard, FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Coast 
Guard Area Maritime Security Committee (through Homeport), and other port 
stakeholders via a cyber backbone to create a common operating picture and enhance 
collaborative efforts.  This section is followed with an examination of costs, benefits, and 
pitfalls associated with increased outside input to the Area Maritime Security Assessment 
process. 
a. Coast Guard Auxiliary Role 
One potential way to gain the benefits of Area Maritime Security 
Committee member input on port security risk assessments, while minimizing Coast 
Guard costs and the time and energy that stakeholders must put forth to provide that 
input, is to task Coast Guard Auxiliarists to meet with and collect the information at 
convenient locations and times, instead of requiring attendance at meetings or workshops 
to accomplish the same task.  Coast Guard Auxiliarists are volunteer personnel who serve 
the country because of their dedication to service and their desire to assist the service in 
the execution of its duties.  Through their work and volunteer experience, Auxiliarists are 
familiar with the maritime environment and the many public and private organizations 
that work together to operate ports in a cost effective, safe, and secure manner.  Coast 
Guard Sector Northern New England has already benefited from Coast Guard Auxiliary 
assistance on Area Maritime Security Assessments in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, 
and New York. In a recent article on MSRAM, Kevin Cady states, “Auxiliarists 
performed vital data entry and acted as liaison between the Coast Guard and port 
stakeholders such as local, county and state EMA directors during the information 
gathering process.”72  Implementation of this Coast Guard Auxiliary program in areas  
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outside New England will allow Captains of the Port to comply with existing 
requirements to gain Area Maritime Security Committee input without using scarce Coast 
Guard active duty personnel resources. 
b. Homeport Secure Web Portal Surveys 
Coast Guard COTPs conduct Area Maritime Security Assessments on an 
annual basis, which is the minimum frequency port stakeholders should provide their 
input on the security risk in the port, and specifically, related to their vessel, facility, or 
area of responsibility.  The latest version of MSRAM allows daily updating of the threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence level to reflect changing local conditions.  This allows the 
COTP to make tactical decisions on day to day resource allocation to optimize the 
efficacy of Coast Guard personnel and platforms.  In order to collect information from 
stakeholders more than once a year, COTPs need to make the input process as simple as 
possible.  This could potentially be accomplished through periodic web based surveys 
through the Homeport secure portal for stakeholders to confirm that security conditions 
under their cognizance are substantially the same as previous input, with an option to 
update vulnerability or consequence information.  COTPs could also request these 
updates when sending out communications on port security threats and changes in 
MARSEC levels via Homeport. 
c. Virtual Maritime Fusion Center 
As previously indicated, Long Beach Police Detective, Candice Wright, 
reviewed four existing public/private programs in a recent Naval Postgraduate School 
thesis.  These included FBI InfraGard, FBI Critical Infrastructure JTTF, Coast Guard 
Area Maritime Security Committees, and Coast Guard Homeport.  While acknowledging 
that these programs provide valuable opportunities for information exchange between the 
wide variety of personnel involved with security in the Los Angeles/Long Beach Port 
Complex, she concludes that “they do not fill the gap required to effectively implement 
port security.”73 Detective Wright initiated creation of a public/private virtual maritime 
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fusion center to link existing systems over a cyber backbone and apply network centric 
warfare theory to transform port security vulnerabilities into strengths through 
information sharing and increased maritime domain awareness.  Unfortunately, this 
system is no longer operational.  Alteration of Homeport to emulate the ease of use of the 
Los Angeles/Long Beach public/private virtual maritime fusion center would improve the 
potential for increased stakeholder input on MSRAM data collection and result in better 
assessment of maritime security risks. 
d. Costs and Benefits 
The previous section outlines three recommendations to get outside input 
from Area Maritime Security Committee members to more accurately assess maritime 
terrorism risk in U.S. ports.  The underlying issue is that acquiring this input is not easy, 
nor is it cheap.  The 2003 cost estimate for implementation of the Area Maritime Security 
regulations contained in 33 CFR 103 was $477 million.74  While this is a high cost, the 
cost of not incorporating AMSC input into port security assessments and then into the 
Area Maritime Security Plan could be significantly higher in the event of even one single 
successful terrorist attack. The inclusion of AMSC input into port security risk 
assessments will impact all committee members who take the time to provide that input.  
Negative impacts could potentially include loss of time focused toward the completion of 
the daily business of running their port.  However, positive impacts include stronger 
relationships between all port security partners, leading to not only increased maritime 
security, but also smoother day-to-day port operations. Interaction with these personnel in 
a non-emergency environment will ensure relationships are formed and solidified before 
they are put to the test in a stressful environment. It should also lead to the creation of 
more useful port security exercises, as the Coast Guard personnel who collect this 
information are also involved in port security exercise design, execution, and evaluation.  
Finally, and most importantly, more accurate maritime risk assessment in each port  
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should lead to more rational allocation of DHS and Coast Guard funding, personnel, 
surface and aviation platform resources to address the hazards of Terrorism-Related 
Maritime Risk. 
e. Potential Pitfalls 
One possible result of this request for increased input from Area Maritime 
Security Committee members on Terrorism-Related Maritime Risk in their port could be 
pushback, as port partners are busy people who may not be inclined to spend the time to 
provide information on their assessment of the level of Terrorism-Related Maritime Risk, 
unless they are convinced of the positive impacts of relationship building and smoother 
port operations during both non-emergency and especially emergency conditions.  If this 
measure does not show a Reduction in Terrorism-Related Maritime Risk each year, there 
could be negative ramifications, as the Coast Guard expends a significant amount of 
funding in its quest to reduce the level of Terrorism-Related Maritime Risk; the 2008 
PWCS Program funding level was $1.794 million.75  Finally, those tasked with 
processing and analyzing information from entities providing input on the MSRAM data 
collection process need to bear in mind that there is a strong connection between 
MSRAM risk ranking and successful port security grant applications, as there certainly 
should be.  However, there may be a tendency to overstate the vulnerability or 
consequences associated with maritime terrorism on the part of port stakeholders which 
could potentially increase the port security grant amounts.  As long as MSRAM 
benchmark guidance is followed throughout the process, and deviations from suggested 
values for vulnerability or consequences are thoroughly evaluated and documented, this 
should not cause major concerns. 
3. Summary 
Three recommendations have been examined to gain outside input on Coast 
Guard assessment of maritime terrorism risk in order to improve that assessment.  Coast 
Guard resource constraints prevent significant additional expenditures to gain this input.  
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The recommendation for volunteer Coast Guard Auxiliarists to assist with collection of 
this input is an extremely low-cost way to comply with existing requirements while 
improving both the risk assessment and relationships between the Coast Guard and its 
port partners.  Homeport is an existing secure web portal that allows Coast Guard 
Captains of the Port and their staffs to communicate swiftly and easily with port security 
partners.  The proposal to implement periodic web based surveys through the Homeport 
secure portal will require approval and programming, but is a relatively simple addition 
to the existing system.  The Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach Virtual Maritime Fusion 
Center initiative had the potential to provide even more positive interaction between the 
Coast Guard and other port partners than Homeport, but is no longer in existence.  The 
potential benefits of modifying Homeport to gain the advantages provided by the pilot 
virtual maritime fusion center in the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach deserve strong 
consideration.  However, this additional interaction will entail the expenditure of time 
and energy on programming and convincing port partners of the utility of using 
Homeport to increase information sharing and maritime domain awareness. 
C. EXPERT JUDGMENT IN THE ASSESSMENT OF ANNUAL 
REDUCTION IN TERRORISM-RELATED MARITIME RISK 
In order to assess annual reduction in terrorism-related maritime risk to arrive at 
the PWCS outcome measure, the Coast Guard gathers in-house subject matter experts 
(SMEs) to assess service capability to prevent maritime terrorism.  As previously 
indicated, the Coast Guard depends on expert judgment to assess maritime terrorism risk 
and the effectiveness of Coast Guard efforts to reduce that risk, since “the theories of 
mathematical probability or of statistical inference cannot deliver the probabilities 
sought.”76 Instead, the Coast Guard elicits expert opinions on the subjective probability 
of various events.  In addition to considering the impact of outside experts on this 
measure, this chapter will examine issues that may affect the assessment of Coast Guard 
actions taken to reduce the risk of terrorism-related maritime terrorism.  This assessment 
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is affected by systematic error, which is represented as bias and addressed in the first part 
of this section.  The assessment is also affected by random error and is addressed in the 
last section of this chapter through expert judgment aggregation.  It is possible to improve 
the accuracy and precision of the Coast Guard PWCS Outcome Measure by reducing the 
systematic and random error in expert judgment used in the calculation of that measure. 
1. Heuristics and Biases 
This section will review heuristics and cognitive biases and then will examine 
motivational biases.  After describing these biases, the next section will list bias reduction 
techniques that may be applicable to improving expert judgment in the quest for a more 
accurate assessment of the PWCS Outcome Measure. 
a. Heuristics and Cognitive Biases 
Due to the limited capacity of the human mind to process and remember 
information, Tversky and Kahneman indicate that people rely on heuristics to simplify 
difficult problems such as the estimation of the probability of uncertain events.77  Gird 
Gigerenzer defines heuristic as “the cognitive process that generates a decision.”78 
Otherwise stated, heuristics are mental rules used to make complex decisions or 
judgments with incomplete data.  They are often useful but can be the source of 
systematic errors or biases.  Cognitive bias occurs “when the expert does not follow 
objective rules or standards,”79 including logical, mathematical, or statistical standards.  
Awareness of these heuristics and the biases they cause can improve estimation of the 
probability of uncertain events.80  Therefore, making experts aware of biases and 
implementing actions to reduce bias should improve both the assessment of maritime 
terrorism risk and the assessment of Coast Guard effectiveness in addressing that risk.  
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The following section will review and define two common heuristics and several biases, 
shown in Table 5.  Meyer and Booker indicate that the most common cognitive bias in 
their work is the inconsistency bias,81 which is the first to be addressed in this section.  
This is followed by an examination of the availability heuristic and associated biases, and 
then the anchoring and adjustment heuristic with its associated biases. 
Table 5. Heuristics and Cognitive Biases 
Heuristics and Cognitive Biases 
Heuristic Bias Description 
-------------- Inconsistency Bias Variability in an expert’s response over time 
resulting in contradictions with previous answers. 
Availability Retrievability Bias Assignment of higher probabilities to events 
experts can easily retrieve from memories. 
Availability Search Set 
Effectiveness Bias 
Assignment of higher probabilities to events for 
which one can easily search. 
Availability Imaginability Assignment of higher probabilities to events 





Tendency to assign probabilities based too 






Tendency to assign overly narrow confidence 
intervals leading to overconfidence in estimated 
probabilities. 
 
(1) Inconsistency Bias. This is a manifestation of the mind’s 
limited capacity to process and hold information that is examined in detail by George 
Miller in his paper “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two.”82 Because of this 
limitation, experts can make initial assumptions that are later contradicted in the 
elicitation process, leading to inconsistent results. Meyer and Booker indicate that this is 
the most common cognitive bias and trace one of the sources of inconsistency bias to 
memory issues, including faulty memory retrieval. In addition, inconsistency can be 
caused by fatigue or confusion.83  Any of the factors outlined can cause experts to shift 
their assessments over the course of an elicitation session. 
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(2) Availability. The availability heuristic causes people to assign 
higher probabilities to events which they can more easily bring to mind.  While it may be 
easier to recall certain events due to their higher frequency, there is no guarantee that 
availability is correlated with actual event probabilities.84  This heuristic has the potential 
to lead to several biases, including retrievability bias, search set effectiveness bias, and 
imaginability bias. 
Retrievability bias causes one to assign higher probabilities to 
events one can easily retrieve from memories.  Familiarity is one cause of this bias, as it 
is easier to recall familiar memories.  Another source of retrievability bias is salience; 
memories with high impact are more retrievable, which causes a person to assign higher 
probability to emotionally charged events. Recency is a further source of this bias, in that 
recent events are more easily imagined than those which have occurred in the distant 
past.85 
Search set effectiveness bias leads us to assign higher probabilities 
to events for which one has better defined search sets.86 This may lead experts to assign 
higher probabilities to the occurrence of previous maritime terrorism events for which 
search sets are available, such as the delivery of waterborne improvised explosive 
devices, and reduced probabilities for occurrence of innovative maritime terrorism events 
for which no clearly defined search sets yet exist. 
Imaginability bias can lead to the improper assessment of risk.  
Excessively high risk will be assigned to events for which it is easy to imagine modes of 
failure, whereas excessively low risk may be assigned if sufficient consideration is not 
given to all possible dangers.87 
(3) Anchoring and Adjustment.  This is the heuristic used to make 
estimates starting with an initial estimate or calculation and then adjusting to arrive at the 
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final estimate.  Use of this heuristic limits the distance between initial and final estimate 
of a subjective probability and leads to the cognitive biases of insufficient adjustment88 
and overconfidence. 
Insufficient adjustment manifests itself when SMEs use whatever 
data they have available to make an initial estimate and then keep successive estimates 
too close to the initial value.  Research has shown that the final subjective probability an 
expert provides depends heavily on the initial estimate, whether that initial estimate is 
provided in advance or is formulated by the expert because of the bias of insufficient 
adjustment.89  As an example, when SMEs estimate the effectiveness of Coast Guard 
efforts toward reducing maritime terrorism risk, providing with experts information of 
prior year estimates of Coast Guard effectiveness of various terrorism prevention 
activities will speed the expert elicitation process but will result in probability estimates 
that are unduly affected by those prior year estimates.  Meyer and Booker indicate that 
because of the limited capacity of the mind to remember and process information, experts 
make initial judgments based on first impressions and only make minor sequential 
adjustments upon receipt of additional information, even when that additional 
information should cause major changes in the initial judgment or even contradict the 
initial judgment.90 
Overconfidence, or underestimation of uncertainty, demonstrates 
the tendency to overestimate knowledge and the tendency to underestimate uncertainty of 
any given situation. Slovic and others indicate that most people are overconfident about 
their estimates of subjective probabilities.91 When overconfident estimators attempt to 
estimate values with a given confidence interval, they are correct less often than 
expected.  When under-confident estimators attempt to estimate values with a given 
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confidence interval, they are correct more often than expected.92  Tversky and Kahneman 
indicate that this bias “is attributable, in part at least, to anchoring”93 as experts will 
insufficiently adjust their initial estimates to estimate upper and lower bounds for a given 
confidence interval. Bar-Hillel argues that a major source of overconfidence stems from 
the availability heuristic: “what we know is almost by definition more available to us than 
what we do not know.”94 
b. Motivational Biases 
In addition to the cognitive bias view of Tversky and Kahneman, Meyer 
and Booker take a view from the perspective of motivational bias, which “occurs when 
an expert consciously or unconsciously makes accommodations to please the 
interviewer.”95  This can also include shifts in elicited judgments to accommodate the 
perceived desires of other experts, supervisors, or clients.  While the majority of bias 
found in the PWCS Outcome Measure can be classified as cognitive, there are some 
aspects of motivational bias that may adversely affect the collection of accurate expert 
judgment, further defined in Table 6 below.  Motivational bias is caused by social 
pressure which could lead to groupthink.  Other motivational biases with the potential to 
adversely affect the PWCS outcome measure include impression management bias and 
wishful thinking. 
Table 6. Motivational Biases 
Motivational Biases 
Bias Description 
Groupthink Premature consensus seeking that may involve internalization, 
compliance, or both 
Impression 
Management 
Tendency of experts to provide answers they think are most desired 
instead of their true opinions. 
Wishful 
Thinking 
Tendency of experts to provide answers for their desired outcome instead 
of an objective assessment of the most likely outcome.  
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(1) Groupthink.  As indicated above, groupthink is a symptom of 
social pressure, or what Janis and McCauley call social influence.96 During expert 
elicitation tainted by groupthink, experts provide judgments according to their perception 
of the group desire instead of according to their own beliefs and experience. McCauley 
proposes the definitions below in his analysis of Janis’s book Groupthink, and expands 
the definition of groupthink beyond that put forth by Janis. These definitions are shown 
in Table 7 below. 
During his review of U.S. government policy-making decisions, 
McCauley finds that group insulation (from outside information), promotional leadership, 
and group homogeneity all “contribute to both internalization and compliance with a 
premature consensus”97  and are therefore good predictors of groupthink. 
Table 7. Groupthink Definitions98 
Groupthink (Janis) premature consensus seeking 
Groupthink (McCauley) premature consensus seeking that may involve 
internalization, compliance, or both 
Compliance public without private agreement 
Internalization 
 
private acceptance of group consensus 
Promotional leadership Leadership by an authority who early in discussion reveals a 
favored policy alternative, especially in the absence of 
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(2)  Impression Management.  This is another bias that is caused 
by social pressure and manifests itself as a desire to please others, whether they are 
interviewers, clients, employers, other experts, or even society as a whole.  This bias 
causes experts to provide answers that they believe are most the desirable instead of their 
actual best answer.99 
(3)  Wishful Thinking.  Experts who are interested in the outcome 
of an event exhibit wishful thinking when their desires influence their judgment 
concerning the outcome of that event, especially if they may benefit from a certain 
outcome.  Often, those who are the most knowledgeable concerning a given topic are 
those who stand to gain or lose the most, depending on their answer.  Meyer and Booker 
state that “what the subjects think should happen will influence what they think will 
happen.”100 
2. Improving Subjective Probability Assessment through Bias Reduction 
While it is important to inform experts about the various biases that affect their 
assessment of subjective probability, this is only one of several steps that must be taken 
to reduce those biases, as most experts are not aware of their use of heuristics and 
consequent biases.  Meyer and Booker propose six steps shown in Table 8 below to 
reduce bias in the elicitation of expert judgment.  This section continues with specific 
recommendations to reduce the systematic error introduced by the biases previously 
enumerated. 
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Table 8. Steps to Reduce Bias in the Elicitation of Expert Judgment101 
1.  Anticipate which biases are likely to occur in the planned elicitation.  The preceding 
section outlines those biases that are most likely to occur in the collection of subjective 
probabilities used to assess Coast Guard effectiveness in reducing the risk of maritime 
terrorism. 
2.  Redesign the planned elicitation to make it less prone to the anticipated biases.  Plans 
for eliciting expert judgments should take into account information about likely biases and 
ideas in the following section to reduce those biases. 
3.  Make the experts aware of the potential intrusion particular biases and familiarize them 
with the elicitation procedures.  A review of the preceding section with the experts will 
provide awareness of the biases most likely to affect the elicitation of subjective 
probabilities for input on the Coast Guard PWCS outcome measure.  The desire is that this 
awareness will result in a reduction of the biases that reduce the accuracy of the measure. 
4.  Monitor the elicitation for the occurrence of bias.  The best way to accomplish this is to 
include an observer in addition to the interviewer who is familiar with signs of biases that 
were identified in step 1. 
5.  Adjust, in real time, to counter the occurrence of bias. The alternatives listed below are 
focused on techniques to reduce biases that adversely affect the collection of expert 
judgments. 
6.  Analyze the data for the occurrence of particular biases.  A number of analysis 
techniques assist with the identification of biased data, including correlation analysis, 
multivariate analysis, and others. 
 
a. Reducing Inconsistency 
As indicated above, fatigue, confusion, and memory issues are all sources 
of inconsistency.  Meyer and Booker suggest two alternatives to reduce inconsistency; 
the first focuses on adjustments to the elicitation process.  Inconsistency reduction during 
elicitation can be accomplished by ensuring experts do not get overly fatigued by 
ensuring expert judgment elicitation sessions do not last more than two hours.  Memory 
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issues can be at least partially addressed with a thorough review of assumptions and 
definitions that relate to the judgment before each elicitation.  The second alternative is to 
provide experts information on their previous judgments and allow them to adjust those 
previous judgments to gain consistency.102 
b. Reducing Bias Caused by the Availability Heuristic 
Retrievability bias, search set effectiveness bias, and imaginability bias all 
occur because one tends to associate higher probabilities of occurrence with events that 
are easily available within memories.  The solution to reduce these biases is to use 
brainstorming, free association, or the Crawford Slip Method to maximize consideration 
of the full spectrum of each expert’s recollections.103  All three of these techniques 
emphasize suspending censorship while collecting ideas.  Free association was developed 
by Sigmund Freud as a psychoanalytic tool, but it is useful to prompt creativity in that all 
ideas related in any way to the original concept are recorded for consideration.  The 
Crawford Slip Method is similar to brainstorming in that it is used to quickly collect ideas 
from a group of people.  While brainstorming is conducted verbally, Crawford Slip 
Method participants write their ideas on a slip of paper.  This ensures less aggressive 
experts get the opportunity to have their ideas presented to the group for consideration, 
whereas brainstorming tends to favor more outspoken group members.   
c. Reducing Anchoring 
Meyer and Booker suggest that anchoring can be reduced by ensuring 
each expert has input from others through group interaction or the Delphi technique, as 
this will force experts to consider others’ viewpoints on the issue. They cite three ideas 
from Boose and Shaw:  
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(1) ask the experts to describe how other experts might disagree with their 
responses,  
(2) ask the experts to temporarily forget recent events, and  
(3) aggregate outcomes with small probabilities into a single, larger class 
to reduce the perceived joint impact in cases in which probability estimates are 
elicited.104 
By going through this process, experts are more likely to shift their 
judgments away from their original estimates. 
d. Reducing Overconfidence and Underestimation of Uncertainty 
This bias can be reduced through repetition and feedback.  Experts take a 
calibration test on general information and are directed to specify an upper and lower 
bound for a given confidence interval.  A well-calibrated expert would get nine out of 10 
questions correct for a 90 percent confidence interval.  Hubbard states that “assessing 
uncertainty is a skill that can be taught with measurable improvement,”105 and posits that 
most experts can markedly improve their calibration by getting feedback on whether they 
are overconfident or under-confident and repeating the process to further refine their 
probability calibration.106 
Arkes offers several principles that can be used to reduce overconfidence.  
Of these, the primary recommendation is for experts to consider alternatives beyond 
those initially conceived.  The result of imagining alternatives necessitates a more 
realistic assessment of the probability of each outcome, and reduces overconfidence in 
the expert’s predicted outcome.107  Hubbard recommends that experts justify the validity 
of their estimate by formulating two pros (why it is realistic) and two cons (why it might 
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be overconfident); this is in line with Arkes’ second principle of listing reasons why the 
expert might be wrong.108  A pro could be the expert’s familiarity with stopping 
identified drug runners via boardings, which lends credibility to an estimate of ability to 
stop a suspect terrorist from conducting a waterside attack on a vessel.  A con could be a 
lack of data on a particular maritime terrorism scenario.  This aligns with the work of 
Koriat et al. cited by Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips that suggests experts should 
seek out information that could indicate why their estimates of subjective probabilities 
might be incorrect to arrive at a more appropriate level of confidence.109 Arkes’ third 
principle is to consider using a devil’s advocate in group interaction.  He states that group 
interaction prompts experts to explain and defend their beliefs, which leads to 
overconfidence. He suggests using a devil’s advocate to force experts to address alternate 
outcomes that would otherwise not come under consideration.110 
e. Reducing Groupthink 
Meyer and Booker propose two alternatives to reduce groupthink in the 
elicitation of expert judgment.  The first involves directly addressing the causes of 
groupthink by ensuring all group members are aware that it may occur and impair the 
collection of expert judgment.  Another way to address the cause of groupthink is to 
reduce the influence of the group leader by waiting until all group members have a 
chance to express their opinions and then getting the leader’s judgments.  This would 
reduce promotional leadership that would lead the group to accept an influential leader’s 
ideas and judgments without sufficient discussion and analysis by the entire group.  A 
further step would be to elicit the leader’s opinion apart from the group.111  In alignment 
with this concept, Adrian Furnham proposes temporarily removing influential members 
from the group to avoid undue influence.  He also suggests that all group members should 
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evaluate group judgments from a critical position, and supports using a devil’s advocate 
to actively contest ideas put forth by the group.112  A second alternative put forth by 
Meyer and Booker is to enhance anchoring.  This can reduce a group’s tendency to 
quickly reach unwarranted consensus.  If experts record their own judgments and 
supporting thoughts before group discussion, they will tend to anchor on those 
judgments, so it will be more difficult to slip into groupthink.113 
Two additional factors that contribute to groupthink are insulation from 
outside information and group homogeneity.  As mentioned in the Chapter IV, current 
information on maritime homeland security mission effectiveness is gathered from Coast 
Guard SMEs.  While Area Maritime Security Committee member input is requested, this 
data collection should also include input from Navy SEAL team members and others 
with expertise in tactics and their use in protecting against maritime threats. Other 
potential sources are those who have evaded maritime security efforts. This would 
include “reformed” or incarcerated terrorists or smugglers and members of organizations 
like Greenpeace and the Sea Shepherds. Additional potential contributors include 
fishermen, yachtsmen, tugboat operators, harbor pilots, and others with experience 
working in marine environments. Ensuring the group has ample access to outside 
information and the formation of heterogeneous groups of experts to assess Coast Guard 
effectiveness in reducing the risk of maritime terrorism will reduce groupthink and result 
in a more accurate PWCS outcome measure. 
f. Reducing Wishful Thinking 
One factor that can reduce wishful thinking includes acquisition of 
judgments from experts with varied backgrounds, as suggested in Chapter IV and 
included in the section above, Reducing Groupthink.  Inherent in this action is a reduction 
in the personal connection at least some of the experts have with the outcome of the 
assessment and a corresponding decrease in wishful thinking.  Another factor discussed 
                                                 
112
 Adrian Furnham, The Psychology of Behaviour at Work (Hove, UK : Psychology Press, 2005), 
555.   
113
 Meyer and Booker, Eliciting and Analyzing Expert Judgment, 179. 
 95
in Chapter IV that can reduce wishful thinking is the disaggregation of activities being 
judged for effectiveness.  While the current LROI model does disaggregate each Line of 
Assurance into separate activities, the model uses high level activities to assess maritime 
homeland security mission effectiveness.  Disaggregation of these high level activities 
into lower level components would decrease wishful thinking and promote better 
assessment of Coast Guard effectiveness.  This would include the breakdown of activities 
like “Specialized Use of Force” into individual components, such as the number of fully 
mission capable small boats with qualified crews and then assessing the effectiveness of 
those components. 
3. Expert Judgment Aggregation 
This section defines and describes a number of ways to aggregate expert judgment 
and contains additional information on each method.  The first is to hold an unstructured 
meeting with experts, which is also called a traditional group.  The second is to use a 
structured method, such as the Delphi technique or the Nominal Group technique.  Each 
of these has advantages and disadvantages which will be examined in this section.  
Finally, expert judgments can be mathematically aggregated into a statistical group 
without the benefit of using one of the aforementioned methods. 
a. Traditional or Unstructured Group 
These groups bring together several experts to allow and promote 
interaction. As indicated in Chapter IV, the interaction between group members’ results 
in better effectiveness estimations of Coast Guard activities undertaken to prevent 
maritime terrorism as the expertise of each group member is combined in through 
interaction. Use of the Delphi technique does not allow this face-to-face interaction and, 
therefore, reduces the opportunity to synergistically merge experts’ judgment. In 
addition, experts in a traditional group possess information about the experience and 
expertise of other group members and are therefore better able to assess the level of 
credibility that should be assigned to each expert’s opinion. Advantages and 
disadvantages of the Traditional Group are shown in Table 9. 
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Table 9. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Traditional Group 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Takes less time than either the Delphi 
Technique or Nominal Group Technique 
Influential experts dominate group 
interaction 
Large amount of flexibility Less influential/lower status experts may 
feel pressure to conform to judgments of 
influential experts 
 Requires travel for face to face meeting of 
experts 
 
b. Delphi Technique 
The Delphi technique was developed by the RAND Corporation as a 
method for the combination of expert judgments to improve forecasts over traditional 
group meetings.  It capitalizes on the positive aspects of traditional groups of experts by 
promoting interaction of ideas with input from a number of sources.114 Since group 
members in the Delphi remain anonymous, participants have the opportunity to avoid the 
negative aspects of traditional groups, including social pressure that could lead to 
groupthink.115  The first three of four characteristics in the following list differentiate the 
Delphi from traditional groups; these characteristics are the aforementioned anonymity, 
iteration, feedback, and statistical aggregation. Experts anonymously complete a 
questionnaire, and through an iterative process, all participants receive a complete set of 
feedback in the form of statistically aggregated results and comments. Upon review of 
this feedback, participants are allowed to change their responses if there is additional 
information that prompts this change. Once the results converge to an appropriate level 
(rarely more than two rounds), statistical aggregation is used to complete the process.  
The Delphi technique takes significantly more time than a traditional group meeting since 
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questionnaires must can be prepared, sent out, collected, processed, and sent back out for 
each round.  Advantages and disadvantages of the Delphi technique are shown in Table 
10. 
Table 10. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Delphi Technique 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Anonymity prevents influential experts 
from dominating outcome 
Experts may not respond to questions 
Anonymity prevents groupthink  
Anonymity allows experts to share 
information without most forms of social 
pressure 
Impression management may still occur 
Allows experts to formulate well thought 
out judgments 
Can be slow: more time consuming than 
either traditional group or Nominal Group 
Technique 
Does not require travel or face to face 




c. Nominal Group Technique 
The Nominal Group technique was developed by Delbecq and Van de Ven 
as another structured meeting type that seeks to gain the advantages of the face-to-face 
interaction that occurs within unstructured groups that is lacking in the Delphi technique 
while avoiding the disadvantages caused by the social pressure in unstructured groups.116 
When used for the elicitation of expert judgment, the following four steps are used. First, 
the experts silently record their own judgments. Second, each expert presents their results 
to the group, without discussion.  Third, all experts participate in a facilitated discussion 
of the results to ensure each group member understand the basis of others’ judgments. 
Finally, experts silently record their own judgments, which are then combined through 
statistical aggregation. The Nominal Group technique requires significantly less time and 
preparation than the Delphi technique.  However, since experts must record judgments 
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individually in writing for the first and fourth steps of the process, Nominal Group 
technique meetings can take more time than traditional group meetings.  Advantages and 
Disadvantages of the Nominal Group technique are shown in Table 11. 
Table 11. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Nominal Group Technique 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Faster than Delphi Method More time consuming than traditional 
group 
Facilitation prevents influential experts 
from dominating outcome 
Requires travel for face to face meeting of 
experts 
Allows experts to share information 
without most forms of social pressure 
Less flexibility than traditional group 
Allows experts to formulate well thought 
out judgments 
Requires good writing skills 
 
d. Mathematical Aggregation—Statistical Groups 
Ravinder considers two aggregation methods: simple averaging and 
weighted averaging.  He states, “Prominent exclusions from this list are the various, often 
very sophisticated, forms of expert resolution using Bayesian methods.  There is no 
evidence, however, of their practicality, or their superiority over simpler forms of 
averaging.”117  Meyer and Booker specify that the average referred to by Ravinder 
includes the mean, median and geometric mean, and that both the median and the 
geometric mean reduce the effect of extreme values of expert judgments.  In addition, 
they indicate that Kahneman and Tversky show that “when experts provide numerical 
answers, they really estimate the median value rather than the mean.”118  As a result, 
when choosing the method of aggregation, serious consideration should be given to using 
the median to represent the best aggregated value of expert judgment. While they provide 
extensive information on determining weights through Saaty pair-wise comparison, 
general linear modeling, and direct estimation, Meyer and Booker conclude that “the best 
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recommendation to date on the weight determination problem is to use equal 
weights…unless some unusual circumstances indicate the use of some different 
weights”119 
While Hall, Mouton, and Blake posit that the performance of interacting 
groups is superior to statistical groups,120 Larrick and Soll relate that more recent work 
by Hastie indicates mathematical averaging of individual responses provides results that 
are as good or better as traditional groups.121  However, as stated both in this section and 
Chapter IV, the interaction between experts of varied backgrounds from both inside and 
outside the Coast Guard is critical to the accurate assessment of Coast Guard capability to 
address terrorism-related maritime risk.  Although the Nominal Group technique requires 
more time and preparation than a traditional group, the Coast Guard should consider 
adopting its use to achieve the advantages outlined above.  The literature review 
completed for this research includes information on more technical expert judgment 
aggregation techniques.  However, indications are that the most sensible approach is to 
use equally weighted averages to aggregate expert judgment as the final step in the 
Nominal Group technique process. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined potential improvements to both the assessment of 
terrorism-related maritime risk, and the assessment of reduction in that risk.  Routinely 
acquiring data on the threats, vulnerabilities and consequences facing port facilities and 
vessels in the U.S. maritime domain from a heterogeneous information pool will improve 
the assessment of terrorism-related maritime risk.  In addition, acquiring data on the 
capability of Coast Guard resources to reduce those threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences from a wider set of sources will allow improved assessment of the annual 
reduction in terrorism-related maritime risk.  This chapter has put forth a number of 
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recommendations to reduce systematic error through minimizing bias common in 
subjective probability estimations that are used to assess the PWCS outcome measure, 
and to reduce random error through expert judgment aggregation. 
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VI. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH 
This research was guided by two goals.  The first goal was to determine if the 
current measure fairly reflects Coast Guard mission effectiveness in achieving homeland 
security.  The Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) outcome measure does 
provide information on risk reduction due to threat, vulnerability, and consequence 
management by the Coast Guard with respect to 15 maritime terrorism scenarios.  As 
stated in the Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment Rating Tool 
(PART) assessment of the Coast Guard PWCS program, the PWCS Outcome Measure 
“scenario-based approach is accepted as a best practice and way ahead among the 
General Accountability Office, academia, and the private sector.”122  While the current 
measure provides a good sense of the effectiveness of Coast Guard efforts to reduce the 
risk of maritime terrorism, there are a number of areas where potential improvements are 
possible.  This finding led to the second goal of the research, which was to provide 
recommendations to more accurately assess Coast Guard homeland security mission 
effectiveness. 
B. IMPLEMENTION RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter combines and summarizes recommendations to improve the 
MSRAM and the LROI models identified in the previous chapters.  Since PWCS 
Outcome Measure calculations performed by the LROI model are based on existing risk 
information from MSRAM, it is imperative to consider improvements to both models.  A 
complete replacement of the PWCS Outcome Measure is not recommended since there 
are three years of data available to compare with future results and implementation of the 
recommendations within the existing models should still significantly improve their 
precision and accuracy.  The following sections of this chapter discuss each 
recommendation and provide a rough cost estimate for implementation. 
                                                 
122
 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Program Assessment, para 2.7.  
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Table 12 provides a concise listing of the recommended enhancements to 
MSRAM and the LROI model, along with an initial cost estimate to implement each 
recommendation.  Thirteen total changes are proposed, and the table indicates the 
proposed order of implementation.  The recommended enhancements are separated into 
two categories depending on which model is affected, MSRAM or the LROI model. 
Table 12. Recommended Enhancements to MSRAM and the LROI Model 
Implementation 
Order 




1 Improve capacity modeling through Maritime 




2 More Accurate Characterization of the Level of 
Successful Intelligence Cueing  
LROI Model No new 
costs 






4 Acquire Outside Expert Input for the LROI 
Model 
LROI Model $30,000 
5 Improve Expert Judgment through Bias 
Reduction and Expert Judgment Aggregation 
LROI Model $20,000 
6 Update Terrorist Threat Levels and Predicted 
Maritime Threat Frequencies 
MSRAM Not 
Releasable 
7 Update Consequence Assessments with new 
Micromodels in MSRAM 
MSRAM $200,000 
8 Expand MSRAM Training and Job Aids/Video 
Training Modules 
MSRAM $400,000 
9 Train Coast Guard Auxiliary to Perform 
MSRAM Data Acquisition and Processing 
MSRAM $160,000 
10 Update Vulnerability Assessments MSRAM Contained 
in #8 
11 Update Risk Ownership Matrix LROI Model $50,000 
12 Modify Homeport to enable Dynamic Risk 
Assessment 
MSRAM No new 
costs 
13 Update Target Lists using Satellite Photography 
and Onsite Visits 
MSRAM $150,000 
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C. IMPLEMENTATION DISCUSSION 
Implementation of the recommendations put forth in this research requires a joint 
effort between the Domestic Port Security Evaluation Division (CG-5142) and Office of 
Performance Management and Assessment (CG-512). The Domestic Port Security 
Evaluation Division is responsible for development and maintenance of MSRAM, along 
with training and review of incoming field data.  The Office of Performance Management 
and Assessment developed the LROI model in conjunction with ABS Consulting, 
maintains and updates the model and produces annual reports on the PWCS Outcome 
Measure.  Personnel from both these organizations have been extremely supportive of 
this research, provided valuable information about the current MSRAM and LROI 
models, offered indispensable insight into potential enhancements to the models, and are 
enthusiastic about implementing changes. Other important organizations are the 
Domestic Ports Division (CG-5441), the Operations Systems Management Division (CG-
635), and the Office of C4 and Sensors Capabilities (CG-761).  These offices at Coast 
Guard headquarters will be key players in the enhancement of Homeport functionality to 
increase data collection in the quest to improve the PWCS Outcome Measure. 
In an unconstrained resource environment, all of the proposed recommendations 
would be implemented to improve the PWCS Outcome Measure to the maximum extent 
possible.  The following section lists the proposed order of implementation for the 
recommendations.  In the event that there is insufficient current year funding to 
implement all of the recommended enhancements, this thesis could potentially serve as 
background material and justification for one or more resource proposals to enable future 
execution of these recommendations. 
1. Improve Capacity Modeling through Maritime Terrorism Prevention 
Activity Alignment 
One of the most significant drivers of the PWCS Outcome Measure is the level of 
capacity modeling.  Though the initial cost estimate indicates that improvement of 
capacity modeling through activity alignment will be more costly than other 
recommended changes, the Coast Guard should strongly consider pursuing this change 
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due to its impact on the PWCS Outcome Measure.  In addition, the Coast Guard has 
initiated a revision to the Combating Maritime Terrorism Strategic and Performance Plan, 
which will be CMT 3.0.  The creation of CMT 3.0 provides the opportunity to bring 
together subject matter experts from each of the component systems to create a unified 
activity and scenario list between the Combating Maritime Terrorism Strategic and 
Performance Plan, Operation Neptune Shield, MSRAM, and the LROI model.  This is 
also an opportunity to clearly state the requirement in the body of CMT 3.0 for 
daily/operational risk profiles to bring more visibility to this requirement. 
The PWCS Outcome Measure is dependent on the estimated effectiveness of 
Coast Guard platforms and personnel to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover 
from terrorist attacks.  The LROI model uses effectiveness judgments of subject matter 
experts for each of the 29 activities conducted to reduce the risk of maritime terrorism, 
along with a capacity factor for the platform used in the operation.  This capacity factor is 
calculated with information from the Coast Guard Abstract of Operations system (AOPS) 
and Operation Neptune Shield results (ONS).  AOPS records the hourly activities of 
Coast Guard platforms (aircraft, boat, or cutter) according to which of the 11 Coast Guard 
missions that platform performs, while ONS results reflect execution of activities in the 
Operation Neptune Shield Operations Order, including aviation and surface patrols, 
boardings, escorts, and security zones.  Unfortunately, the maritime terrorism prevention 
activities in MSRAM, the LROI model and Operation Neptune Shield are not closely 
linked, which makes calculation of the PWCS Outcome Measure problematic.  
Alignment of the activity libraries in each of these systems and the Combating Maritime 
Terrorism Strategic and Performance Plan would be an important step toward improved 
capacity modeling, and would result in better assessment of the impact of Coast Guard 
activities in the reduction of maritime terrorism risk.  The MSRAM team has conducted 
effectiveness measurement of various Coast Guard adaptive force packages and could 
provide valuable insight into and assistance with improving activity effectiveness 
assessments using Coast Guard and outside experts.  The estimated cost to conduct 
facilitated meetings with representatives from each of the affected systems combined 
with subsequent programming to effect the changes outlined above is $500,000. 
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2. More Accurate Characterization of the Level of Successful 
Intelligence Cueing in the LROI Model 
Over half of the Lines of Assurance in the LROI model are dependent on 
intelligence cueing to successfully prevent acts of maritime terrorism.  As a result, the 
assumed level of intelligence cueing has a major impact on the PWCS Outcome Measure, 
and this recommendation has a high priority for implementation.  The LROI model 
assumes the same level of intelligence cueing for each of the 15 maritime terrorism 
scenarios.  More accurate characterization of the level of successful intelligence cueing 
will directly lead to improved assessment of Coast Guard homeland security mission 
effectiveness.   
The 2008 Coast Guard Posture Statement indicates, “The Coast Guard 
Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) is the National Level Coordinator for collection, 
analysis, production, and dissemination of Coast Guard intelligence…[and]…partners 
closely with the Director of National Intelligence and other components of the 
Intelligence Community to maintain an integrated intelligence regime.”123  Consequently, 
the ICC is in the best position to provide more detailed information on the expected level 
of intelligence cueing as they provided input on the current estimate, and are considering 
providing an updated intelligence cueing assessment for each of the 15 maritime 
terrorism scenarios.  At this point, the assessment would be prepared in-house, so no new 
costs would be incurred as a result of this work. 
3. Create, Share, and Review Additional Maritime Terrorism Scenarios 
Since no new costs are associated with the recommendation to create, share, and 
review additional maritime terrorism scenarios, this can be implemented immediately.  
As stated in Chapter IV, MSRAM results would be improved by expanding the ability to 
create and subsequently share additional scenarios amongst local, regional and national 
users.  MSRAM already allows creation of custom scenarios by field units, and these are 
                                                 
123
 U.S. Coast Guard Office of Budget and Programs, U.S. Coast Guard Posture Statement, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard Office of Budget and Programs, 2008), 34, U.S. Coast Guard, 
http://www.uscg.mil/comdt/DOCS/LOW.RES.CG%20FY09%20Posture%20Statement.FINAL.Jan29.pdf 
(accessed March 8, 2009). 
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reviewed for potential incorporation into subsequent annual MSRAM software updates. 
This cycle time could be reduced by promoting interaction between sectors when custom 
scenarios are created to provide near real time adaptability and usability.  These scenarios 
could be posted on the Homeport MSRAM microsite for use by other sectors and could 
then be used by other Coast Guard sectors instead of waiting for the next strategic annual 
MSRAM update.  This will reduce the possibility of terrorists using methods that are not 
accounted for by existing annual MSRAM scenarios.  At this point, MSRAM does not 
include either transfer scenario contained in the LROI model, though plans are in place to 
add these two scenarios with MSRAM PLUS software in FY 2009.  Since the MSRAM 
microsite already exists and the MSRAM team already has a budget for scenario updates, 
there is no anticipated additional cost associated with implementing this 
recommendation. 
As indicated above, alignment between activities in MSRAM and the LROI 
model will significantly enhance the usefulness of MSRAM data for use in the LROI 
model and will result in more accurate assessment of the PWCS Outcome Measure.  An 
additional important improvement would be the ability to create additional scenarios in 
the LROI model in alignment with MSRAM scenarios.  As stated in Chapter IV, this is to 
avoid the issue of leaving gaps between existing scenarios: adversaries will try to exploit 
attacks not accounted for in any of the scenarios.  Scenario updates in both MSRAM and 
the LROI model are highly recommended in conjunction with the revision of the 
Combating Maritime Terrorism Strategic and Performance Plan, and implemented on a 
joint basis to achieve and maintain alignment between the models.  Once MSRAM 
contains the transfer scenarios, the model scenarios will be in alignment, so no new costs 
are contemplated for the LROI model until additional scenarios are proposed. 
4. Acquire Outside Expert Input for the LROI Model 
The next highest priority recommendation for implementation is the acquisition of 
outside expert input on the effectiveness of Coast Guard activities to reduce terrorism-
related maritime risk.  This was pointed out by the Office of Management and Budget in 
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the 2006 PART review as an area in which the Coast Guard could improve the PWCS 
Outcome Measure, and the estimated implementation cost is relatively low. 
As mentioned in Chapter I and discussed at length in Chapters IV and V, the 
inclusion of outside experts is critical to improve the assessment of Coast Guard 
effectiveness in reducing terrorism-related maritime risk.  Each of those interviewed 
voiced the opinion that this additional input would provide a more accurate assessment of 
Coast Guard effectiveness, while Chapter V indicates that the use of heterogeneous 
groups of experts will result in a more accurate PWCS outcome measure.  The cost 
estimate to acquire input from a group of five outside experts during an annual five-day 
PWCS performance assessment meeting is $30,000. 
5. Improve Expert Judgment through Bias Reduction and Expert 
Judgment Aggregation 
Another recommendation relating to the use of expert judgment that lends itself to 
implementation in conjunction the previous recommendation is the improvement of 
expert judgment through bias reduction and expert judgment aggregation.  This is another 
area in which the Coast Guard could improve the PWCS Outcome Measure with a 
relatively low estimated implementation cost. 
Chapter V covered an extensive list of procedures to reduce bias, along with a 
recommendation for expert judgment aggregation that would be used during the PWCS 
performance assessment meeting. The first technique to reduce biases in expert judgment 
elicitation is to ensure the experts are familiar with the biases so that they are aware of 
the potential detriment to expert judgment.  Other areas to address are reducing 
inconsistency, retrievability bias, search set effectiveness bias, imaginability bias, 
anchoring, overconfidence, groupthink, and wishful thinking.  The use of a facilitator to 
guide subject matter experts in the use of the Nominal Group Technique allows critical 
interaction between experts of varied backgrounds from both inside and outside the Coast 
Guard to gain multiple perspectives while avoiding groupthink.  Using the ideas set forth 
in Chapter V, the facilitator can take actions before and during expert judgment 
elicitation to attenuate the other biases listed above.  Unless there are strong indications 
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to do otherwise, equally weighted averages should be used to aggregate expert judgment 
in the final step of the Nominal Group technique.  The cost estimate for a facilitator to 
conduct an annual five-day PWCS performance assessment meeting along with travel 
expenses for Coast Guard SME attendance is $20,000. 
6. Update Terrorist Threat Levels and Predicted Maritime Threat 
Frequencies 
Terrorist threat updates are the next priority, including predicted maritime 
terrorism frequencies.  As indicated in Chapter III, the Coast Guard Intelligence 
Coordination Center (ICC) provides information on the threat level for calculation of 
existing terrorism-related maritime risk in MSRAM annually, and through the National 
Maritime Terrorism Threat Assessment (NMTTA) biennially.  These include assessments 
of terrorist intent, capability and presence required to conduct direct attacks, exploitation 
of vessels for those attacks, or transfer of terrorists or WMD through the maritime 
domain.  The threat updates provided by the Coast Guard ICC affect MSRAM, which in 
turn affects the LROI model, and leads to the recommendation to implement this change 
as a relatively high priority.   
The predicted maritime terrorism frequency affects every effectiveness 
calculation in the LROI model, and an update to this frequency could potentially be 
accomplished as part of future National Maritime Terrorism Threat Assessments.  A 
headquarters planning team used information from ICC combined with additional 
research to estimate the frequency of the scenarios in the LROI model.  Current 
frequencies are one direct attack/exploitation every year, one transfer of terrorists every 
10 years, and one transfer of weapons of mass destruction every 20 years. As stated in 
Chapter III, while these frequency estimates are aligned with at least one other study, an 
examination and update of the estimated frequency of direct attack/exploitation, transfer 
of terrorists, and transfer of WMD is highly recommended.   
Continued annual MSRAM threat updates, biennial NMTTA updates, and 
inclusion of predicted maritime terrorism frequencies will ensure the threat 
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characterization in MSRAM is as accurate as possible.  The cost estimate for the 
NMTTA is not available for publication since there is an active contract for this work that 
has not yet been awarded. 
7. Update Consequence Assessments with New Micromodels in MSRAM 
There is a need to periodically update and improve consequence assessments to 
more accurately characterize those associated with terrorism-related maritime risk.  As 
previously indicated, this will require the input of engineering and financial experts to 
assess direct economic impact, and economic experts to provide information on 
secondary economic impacts.  The creation of micromodels to capture this input and 
information to more accurately enumerate the primary and secondary economic 
consequences associated with an event of maritime terrorism is recommended for 
consideration because of the success achieved with the response calculator and blast 
calculator micromodels already used in MSRAM. The cost estimate to create 
micromodels in MSRAM to more accurately assess the consequences of maritime 
terrorist attacks is $200,000. 
8. Expand MSRAM Training and Job Aids/Video Training Modules 
While expanding MSRAM Training and Job Aids/Video Training Modules is 
important, this item is recommended for later implementation because a MSRAM 
training program already exists.  Nonetheless, an expanded MSRAM training program 
will ensure that all field personnel using MSRAM are familiar with the program and use 
it correctly.  This will improve data quality in both MSRAM and the LROI model, and 
thereby improve the PWCS Outcome Measure.  Another desired outcome is a reduction 
in conflicts between local assessments and during the review process by Coast Guard 
district, area, and headquarters staffs.  The cost estimate to expand the MSRAM training 
program to enable on site training of 250 personnel annually, along with updates of 
existing job aids and video training modules is approximately $400,000. 
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9. Train Coast Guard Auxiliary to Perform MSRAM Data Acquisition 
and Processing 
Coast Guard Auxiliary training for the use of MSRAM is the next item 
recommended for implementation because of the very low cost of achieving the benefit 
the Coast Guard Auxiliarists can provide.  Five of the eight recommendations to improve 
MSRAM refer to enhanced information collection.  An option that has proven successful 
in this arena is Coast Guard Auxiliary acquisition and processing of data from Area 
Maritime Security Committee members to assist Captains of the Port with MSRAM data 
input requirements.  The estimated cost to conduct a five day training session with travel 
and per diem for a total of 100 Coast Guard Auxiliarists on the use of MSRAM would be 
approximately $160,000, which would provide an average of three trained Coast Guard 
Auxiliarists at each sector, though larger sectors with more available Auxiliarists would 
receive more training quotas.  This cost does not consider any overhead requirements for 
additional security clearances.   
10. Update Vulnerability Assessments 
While beneficial, the recommendation to update vulnerability assessments is 
relatively late in the implementation sequence since Coast Guard sector personnel already 
assess attack achievability, system security, and target hardness to complete the 
vulnerability assessment process in MSRAM, as discussed in Chapter III.  These 
assessments are reviewed by district, area and headquarters personnel along with other 
MSRAM data.  As indicated in Chapter IV, while many components of maritime critical 
infrastructure/key resources have undergone vulnerability assessments, these require 
periodic revisions.  Vessel and port facility owners should provide updated vulnerability 
assessment information to the COTP.  This will ensure MSRAM reflects the latest, best 
data available.  The benefit will be more accurate risk assessment, and a resultant 
improvement in the PWCS Outcome Measure accuracy. 
The Coast Guard Auxiliary is a prime candidate for this data collection and 
processing.  In addition, the annual MSRAM update should include results of MTSA spot 
checks to provide information collected in person on target vulnerability.  If existing 
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Coast Guard personnel resources are used to update vulnerability assessments as 
recommended, then the increased cost to collect and process this additional information 
should be covered by the Auxiliarist cost cited above. 
11. Update Risk Ownership Matrix 
The recommendation to update the Coast Guard Risk Ownership matrix is fairly 
late in the implementation sequence since the existing matrix contains useful though 
somewhat dated information and the higher priority recommendations address issues that 
have greater potential for large-scale impact. As with many of the other 
recommendations, the benefit of implementing this recommendation is an improvement 
in the accuracy of the PWCS Outcome Measure, which takes into account the level of 
Coast Guard risk ownership for each maritime terrorism scenario. 
Chapter III examined the Coast Guard portion of risk ownership for each of the 15 
scenarios in the LROI model, arrived at through consultation with Coast Guard personnel 
who participated in the 2005 risk-based PWCS Outcome Measure effort.  Changes in 
laws, regulations, policies and partnerships since 2005 indicate the need for the Coast 
Guard portion of risk ownership to be reassessed.  The estimated cost to collect current 
information, update the Risk Ownership matrix and incorporate this information into the 
LROI model is $50,000. 
12. Modify Homeport to Enable Dynamic Risk Assessment 
The alteration of Homeport to gain the functionality of Virtual Maritime Fusion 
Centers is significant in its own right, and Coast Guard support of this initiative on a 
nationwide basis is highly recommended.  While the collection of dynamic risk 
assessment information is an important step forward, the recommendation to modify 
Homeport to enable Dynamic Risk Assessment through Homeport Secure Web Surveys 
and Virtual Maritime Fusion Centers appears later in the implementation sequence 
because there is a need to improve data collection and analysis before increasing data 
collection frequency. 
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In addition to threat, vulnerability and consequence updates recommended in the 
preceding paragraphs, the Combating Maritime Terrorism Strategic and Performance 
Plan (CMT 2.0) requires periodic MSRAM updates to create an operational risk profile 
for each COTP zone throughout the course of the year.  These updates would be based on 
information collected from Area Maritime Security Committee members at AMSC 
meetings, in person, over the phone, or through Homeport Secure Web Portal Surveys.  
These surveys would be periodic Web-based surveys sent through the Homeport secure 
portal for stakeholders to confirm that security conditions under their cognizance are 
substantially the same as previous input, with an option to update vulnerability or 
consequence information.  Another avenue to acquire dynamic risk assessment 
information is through a modification to Homeport so it emulates the ease of use seen in 
the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach Virtual Maritime Fusion Center.  As stated in the 
previous chapter, this would increase information sharing by linking the FBI InfraGard 
Program, the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Coast Guard Area Maritime Security 
Committee, local law enforcement agencies, and other port stakeholders to create a 
common operating picture and enhance collaborative efforts.  The Homeport 
development team in the Coast Guard Headquarters Operations Systems Management 
Division already has a budget for program maintenance, and they are considering 
implementation of Secure Web Portal Surveys at no additional cost.  Before developing 
the cost estimate to alter Homeport to gain the advantages of a Virtual Maritime Fusion 
Center for all Coast Guard COTP zones, requirements must be agreed upon by the Coast 
Guard Headquarters Domestic Ports Division, the Domestic Port Security Evaluation 
Division, and the Office of C4 and Sensors Capabilities.   
13. Update Target Lists using Satellite Photography and Onsite Visits 
The recommendation to conduct target list updates appears last in the 
implementation plan because sector personnel already collect data on an annual basis to 
update target lists, and this recommendation was to provide an additional check to ensure 
all appropriate targets are continually included in MSRAM. 
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Nonetheless, continued emphasis must be maintained on annual target list 
updates, including the addition of new maritime critical infrastructure/key resources and 
vessels within each COTP Zone.  This will ensure all potential targets subject to maritime 
terrorism are included in MSRAM.  Targets no longer physically present or no longer 
periodically transiting the zone should be removed from the current MSRAM database 
but can be kept for historical and auditing purposes.  While each sector updates this list 
annually, analysis of satellite photography and other available information such as 
required annual onsite visits would serve as a valuable cross check on field level target 
update information.  The estimated cost for this analysis is $150,000. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
MSRAM accounts for threat shifting through quantification of characteristics that 
affect terrorist selection of one target over another.  This includes attack achievability, 
system security, and target hardness, which are components of vulnerability.  
Components of consequence also affect threat shifting; including the expected number of 
deaths or injuries, primary and secondary economic impact, environmental impact, 
national security/national defense impacts, and symbolic impact, quantifying damage to 
landmarks.  All of these characteristics are quantified as part of the MSRAM data 
acquisition process.  Less information is available about dynamic threat shifting that 
occurs during an attack as a result of security presence at the scene of an intended target 
as required by Operation Neptune Shield or other factors.  Future research into this area 
has the potential to better inform the Coast Guard, other government agencies, and 
owners and operators of port facilities and vessels affected by the threat shift process in 
the maritime domain. 
As previously indicated, the LROI model uses modified event chains to represent 
the events leading up to and after a terrorist event.  The development of event trees to 
represent threat shifting and other terrorist options before and during an attack is an area 
that may be considered for future research. 
The Coast Guard models reviewed in this research are based on the assumption 
that the threat, vulnerability and consequences assigned in the assessment process match 
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those of terrorists.  Another area of valuable future research would be an examination of 
these assumptions to determine if the Coast Guard is using the same criteria as terrorists 
to quantify risk in the maritime domain. 
E. SUMMARY 
As the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security, the Coast Guard is 
responsible for execution of five mission programs directly related to homeland security: 
Drug Interdiction; Migrant Interdiction; Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Other 
Law Enforcement; and Defense Readiness.  This research has examined measurement of 
Coast Guard mission effectiveness through the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security 
outcome measure and made recommendations to improve this measure through 
enhancements to the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model and the LROI model on 
which the outcome measure is based.  Implementation of the recommendations contained 
in this research will lead to more accurate assessment of Coast Guard effectiveness in 
achieving homeland security, and result in improved allocation of resources in the quest 
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